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Abstract
This document is the final report for a background paper for the ECA Old-Age Insurance
report, using a General Equilibrium approach to analyze aging and pension reforms in two
countries from the Europe and Central Asia region, Poland and Slovakia. Compared to the
second interim report, this document adds analysis for some additional reforms, sensitivity
analysis and policy implications.
Low fertility and increases in life expectancy lead to aging of the population. As the
number of young active households is growing less rapidly (or even shrinking) than old
households prone to retirement, the financing of pension systems is a challenge when these
systems are based on the pay-as-you-go scheme. All developed countries rely to some extent
on pay-as-you-go schemes. The basic challenge of pension financing created by population
aging is common to many developed countries. The challenge confronted by countries in the
ECA region may however be larger, for several reasons. In particular, high participation
in informal markets decreases government revenue, adding to immediate pension financing
difficulties. Using an expanded overlapping generations model with endogenous retirement
decisions with formal and informal sectors, simulation predicts that aging would increase
social security deficits by more than 5% of GDP by 2100. Among the various reforms
considered, cuts in pension benefits are the most successful at containing the deficits if the
sole goal of reforms is financial sustainability. Increases in retirement age may be preferable
if additional goals are considered. Targeting a decrease in informality alone may not help
to decrease the deficit in the long run because gains in revenues are offset by the increase in
pension payments.
For the sake of completeness and ease of reading, some parts of the second interim report,
dated 12 October 2012, have been included without any change in this final report 1.
Keywords: population aging, pension reforms, formal and informal sectors
JEL-Classification: D58, E26, H55, J11, J26, J65
∗Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna. Contact: davoine@ihs.ac.at,
keuschnigg@ihs.ac.at and schuster@ihs.ac.at. This report is part of the deliverables for World Bank con-
tract number 7163328 dated 7 June 2012.
1Only small changes in sections 1, 2, 3 and 5 have been applied. Differences in these sections are clearly
identified. There are significant changes and additions in section 6. Sections 4, 7 and 8 are new.
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1 Introduction2
Economic development is associated with population aging, the fact that the proportion of old
individuals in the society is increasing, a mechanical consequence of declining rates of fertility and
increases in life expectancy. According to the United Nations (2011) demographic projections,
the old-age dependency ratio, which computes the number of persons aged 65 years and above
over the number of persons 15 to 64 years old, should increase from a worldwide average of 12%
in 2010 to 30% in 2060. In Eastern Europe, the ratio should increase from 19% to 46% and in
Central Asia from 7% to 27%. These demographic changes can have large economic consequences.
Unless pension systems are reformed, there can be large financial deficits: with a dominating
pay-as-you-go component, the number of young working households will be insufficient to finance
the consumption of old retired households. Comparing pensions systems and planned reforms in
the EU27 zone, the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (2012) estimate
that population aging will increase pension expenditures by more than 5 percentage points of
GDP in several countries between 2010 and 2060, including Slovakia. In Luxembourg, pension
expenditures should rise from 9% of GDP to more than 18% of GDP.
All developed countries have to answer the same pension financing question posed by population
aging. For countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region however, the challenge is
larger, for several reasons. These include high inherited pension expenditures, a large informal
sector, high burdens of taxes and contributions. As the common challenge of population aging
has been well documented and researched, we focus our discussion on countries in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (ECA3).
First, the transition to a market economy started with large output and employment drops.
Many countries used early retirement schemes to ease the transition (Boeri and Terrell, 2002;
OECD, 2003; Schneider and Burger, 2005; Chawla et al., 2007), increasing pension expenditures.
As Svejnar (2002) writes, “the promises of these systems, which are largely pay-as-you-go, are
not sustainable”.
Second, the informal sector is larger in the ECA region than in other developed countries. Ac-
cording to estimates from Schneider et al. (2010), the average shadow economy size in the ECA
region was 36.5% of official GDP in 2005, compared to 13.5% of GDP in high income OECD
countries.4 Large informal market participation reduces the base for general tax revenues and
pension budgets. Increasing tax and contributions rates to compensate for the smaller base may
however have the counter-productive effect of increasing the informality rate (Schneider and En-
ste, 2000). Taking an average of 22 empirical studies, Schneider (2012) finds that the “increase of
tax and social security contribution burdens” factor explains 50% of the influence of institutional
factors on shadow economies, the second factor accounting for a mere 15%. Finding the right
balance between incentives for participation in the formal labor market and financing of social
security is thus a difficult task (Chawla et al., 2007).
Third, current contribution and tax rates are already fairly high, by international standards
(Schneider and Burger, 2005). Increasing rates to generate additional government revenue and
finance public pension systems can make the informal labor market more attractive. The room
for additional revenue is thus small, an additional constraint to pension reforms.
2Except for last two paragraphs, identical to the second interim report, dated 12 October 2012.
3Strictly speaking, ECA denotes the entire Europe and Central Asia region. For ease of reading, we also use
the abbreviation ECA for the subsample of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
4One should however note the heterogeneity within both groups. The size of the shadow economy ranges from
8.5% of GDP in 2005 for Switzerland to 27.1% for Italy or 29.9% for Mexico, while the lowest value in the ECA
region is attained by the Slovak Republic with 17.6% in contrast to 26.9% for Poland or even 65.1% for Georgia.
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For an in-depth analysis of aging and reform options in the ECA region we focus on two countries,
Poland and Slovakia. We believe that these two countries constitute a small sample which is
reasonably representative of the ECA region, as they cover different portions of the demographic
and economic spectrum: one is large while the other is comparatively small, both face a significant
population aging challenge, and pensions expenditure projections predict very different outcomes.
With 38 millions inhabitants, Poland is one of the 10 most populated countries in Europe while
Slovakia, with less than 6 millions, is in the lower tier. Figure 1 shows that population aging in
these two countries is no smaller challenge than in the rest of Europe. Demographic projections
used by the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (2012) even predict that
lower than average fertility rates and net migration flows will lead to some of the highest old-age
dependency ratios in the EU27 zone in 2060 (Poland: 2nd highest; Slovakia: 4th highest).
Even if Poland and Slovakia face the same demographic challenge, past and planned reforms are
different and are expected to have very different economic consequences. Poland currently spends
more on pensions but its pioneer 1999 reform towards a multi-pillar system is predicted to lead
to a decrease in expenditures, according to projections from the Economic Policy Committee and
the European Commission (2012) (11.8% of GDP in 2010 versus 9.6% in 2060). In contrast, the
European Commission estimates an increase in pension expenditure for Slovakia (8.0% of GDP
in 2010 versus 13.2% in 2060), which also implemented a multi-pillar system in 2004/2005. A
main explanation is that the Polish PAYG system relies on notional accounting, hence benefits
vary according to changes in life-expectancy also after retirement, while the latter is not true in
the Slovak PAYG pillar, where benefits are calculated according to points earned during time
before retirement. Differences between the two countries also take place in other dimensions of
the labor market, with Poland having one of the lowest net replacement ratio (considering taxes
and benefits together) and Slovakia one of the largest (Schneider and Burger, 2005).
There are several approaches to evaluate pensions financial sustainability under an aging popula-
tion. The three standard methods in the literature are projections, generational accounting and
overlapping generations modeling. As discussed by Jimeno et al. (2008), these methods deliver
similar conclusions when no reforms are considered, but only overlapping generations models are
able to capture general equilibrium effects of reforms and deliver a more accurate evaluation of
the effect of reforms.
We will thus perform the analysis of the effect of aging and different pension reforms using an
overlapping generations model. The critical components of the model are as follows. The overlap-
ping generations structure needs to be fine enough to capture the long run demographic changes.
Endogenous labor supply decisions need to include hours, participation and retirement decisions,
as tax changes affect hours and participation decisions and pension reforms may change retire-
ment behavior of households. Finally, given the importance of the informal sector in transition
economies and the impact on pension expenditures and government revenue, the model needs to
capture household decisions to participate either in the formal or in the informal market.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any overlapping generations model with
endogenous decisions both on retirement and on informality. We will thus expand the Berger et al.
(2009) model to endogenous participation decisions in formal or informal sectors. This model
is based on the probabilistic aging overlapping generations structure (Grafenhofer et al. 2007),
where mortality rates are age-dependent, suitable for a fine analysis of demographic changes. It
contains endogenous decisions margins along several dimensions, including hours, participation,
retirement, education and search effort while unemployed. The model is already calibrated for
Poland and Slovakia.
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Figure 1: Projected age pyramids in Europe, Poland and Slovakia, as per United Nations (2011).
(a) Europe
(b) Poland
(c) Slovakia
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The extension to informality features several components of prominent theoretical analysis in the
field. As Fugazza and Jacques (2004), we assume that goods produced in the formal and in the
informal sector can not be distinguished. Differences between sectors will thus lie in production
and we will assume that the production technology in the informal sector is simple so that no
capital is required, consistent with Ihrig and Moe (2004) and Amaral and Quintin (2006). Neither
workers nor firms in the informal sector pay any taxes. Because goods are indistinguishable for the
consumer, we follow Bird and Smart (2012) in assuming that an informal sector producer charges
the same price as the after-tax price of a formal sector producer. Informal sector producers will
thus be able to keep the VAT for themselves. As Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012), we assume
that households have a different tolerance for working in the formal sector, where regulation is
constraining behavior. Households choose to work in the formal or informal sector depending on
this unique tolerance level, social security benefits they would gain by participating in the formal
market and taxes they avoid by participating in the informal market. In line with Fortin et al.
(1997) and Albrecht et al. (2009), unemployed households may find home production or welfare
benefits more attractive than joining either of the formal or informal labor markets.
The resulting overlapping generations model with endogenous retirement and informal market
participation decisions is appropriate for the analysis of the effect of population aging on macroe-
conomic outcomes and public finances. It allows to compare taxation and pension policy reforms
taking into account behavioral responses from households. For instance, it can quantify the net
effect of decreases in the rate of social security contributions, which on the one hand reduce
pension financing for a given contribution base, but on the other hand increase the incentive for
formal market participation and so increase the contribution base.
Simulations confirm the challenge posed by population aging on the financing of social security,
deficits growing by more than 5 percentage points of GDP in constant population terms until
2100. They also show that population aging alone, without any reforms, reduces the rate of in-
formality by as much as 30% and that informality alone is not a cause for social security deficit.
From the various reforms considered, reductions in pension benefits are the most efficient reforms
to cut the social security deficit due to aging, if the sole goal of reforms is financial sustainabil-
ity. Increases in the retirement age may be preferable if one trades-off financial sustainability,
reduction in informality, prevention of old-age poverty and high output per capita.
The next section presents a simple overlapping generations models with endogenous retirement
and informality participation. Section 3 summarizes the additional structure of the full scale
model used for aging and pension reform analysis. Section 5 summarizes the calibration ap-
proach. Section 6 presents and discusses the result of the analysis. Section 7 derives some policy
implications. The last section concludes.
2 A simple model with retirement and informality5
We start by a detailed presentation of the overlapping generations model with endogenous re-
tirement and informality decisions, a scientific novelty. For ease of understanding and to isolate
the crucial novel features, we keep the model simple. A complete and more realistic model will
be used for demographic and policy evaluation, presented in section 3.
5Contents essentially identical to the revised first interim report, dated 14 August 2012. Some clarifications
have been added in subsections 2.2 and 2.4.
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2.1 Overview
For simplicity we consider the Diamond-Samuelson overlapping generations structure with 2
generations and no uncertainty. All households from the first generation (the young) decide to
participate in a labor market or not; if they decide to participate, they then decide to join the
formal or the informal labor market. Households from the second generation (the old) choose
their retirement date; before retiring, they choose to work in the formal or the informal market.
The young also decide how much to consume in the first period and how much to save for
the second period. When young, non-participants receive welfare benefits. When old, retirees
receive a pension, with a formal market earning related part and a flat anti-poverty part.6 Old
households who always chose to work in the informal labor market thus only receive the flat
pension.
From a modeling perspective, the retirement decision when old is equivalent to the participation
decision when young, which helps to keep the model simple: a low participation when old is
interpreted as early retirement. One can think for instance of periods covering 30 years. If
individuals start their working life in average at age 20, a participation rate in the second period
of 0.4 would correspond to retirement at age 62.
Government gets revenue from labor income taxes and consumption taxes and uses it to finance
own consumption, welfare benefits and pay-as-you-go pensions. For simplicity we assume that
government has no debt.
We assume that the economy is small and takes the interest rate as given.
We do not focus on demographic changes at this stage, so that we can assume constant population
and certainty in life duration7. In the complete model, uncertainty in life duration will be
introduced as well as age-dependent mortality rates, to better capture demographic changes and
population aging in particular, most relevant for pension reform analysis. Other realistic features
of labor markets and public finance will be introduced in the full scale model, such as labor supply
along the intensive margin, productivity growth, unemployment, heterogeneity in skills, public
debt, incentives for postponed retirement and capital income taxes. Details will be provided in
section 3.
2.2 Specifying informality
If they decide to participate in any labor market, households then decide whether to join the
formal or the informal labor market. This second decision will depend on characteristics of the
informal labor market and regulation. The basic difference between the informal and the formal
sector is that agents in the informal sector operate outside regulation. Since it does not capture
underreporting, the model includes informal economies but not shadow economies8.
More specifically, the particular features of the model related to informal labor markets are as
follows (when relevant, we refer to similar theoretical analyzes):
6The pension system of neither the Slovak Republic nor Poland features a purely flat anti-poverty part. This
part will nevertheless be useful in the calibration to match total pension expenditure and capture non-linearities
in the the pension system. We return to this question in section 3.
7Uncertain life duration is more realistic. A Blanchard (1985) OLG structure is appropriate when there is no
retirement. Richer OLG structures are needed for both retirement (whether exogenous or endogenous decisions)
and uncertainty in life duration. Since our focus is simplicity and the interplay of retirement and informality, we
prefer to opt for certain life duration and a Diamond-Samuelson structure.
8Calibration could but does not have to rely on shadow economy output estimates. As will be explained in
appendix A.3, we will not rely on such estimates.
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• Production in the informal market is simple, requires no capital, uses a linear technology
(with productivity growing at the same rate as in the formal market; Ihrig and Moe, 2004;
Amaral and Quintin, 2006)
• Labor supply in the informal market is unobserved and constant (no labor income taxes
are paid)
• Government can not distinguish between non-participants and informal labor market par-
ticipants
• In particular, informal labor market participants pay no labor income taxes and can claim
non-participant welfare and anti-poverty pension benefits
• Goods produced in the formal and informal markets can not be distinguished and are perfect
substitutes for households (Fugazza and Jacques, 2004) but informal market producers
prefer to sell to households (for immediate consumption) rather than firms (for investment),
to minimize the risk of being discovered by the government
• Informal sector participants sell their goods to households in the same market as formal
goods producers, and goods being indistinguishable, receive and keep consumption taxes9
(Bird and Smart, 2012)
• There is no black market bank so capital income from informal labor market participants
is also taxed (via source taxation)
• Working in the formal labor market generates net disutility compared to participating in
the informal market. On one hand these costs can be motivated as psychological cost of
compliance with regulations. See for example Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012. On the
other hand one could think of disutility of not conforming to social norms or actual costs
of being caught and punished when working informally. The model will not distinguish
between these forms of disutility and always address both forms jointly as net disutility.
Hence, whether the net disutility is captured on the formal or informal side is a matter of
presentation.
2.3 Household behavior
We denote with an index a = 1 variables relating to the first period of the life of a household
(young), and a = 2 for the second period (old). Decision variables are:
• Cat : how much to consume
• δat ∈ [0, 1]: participation probability in any labor market
• When a = 2: δat defines the retirement age
• ζat ∈ [0, 1]: in case of participation, probability of joining the formal labor market
We assume that working in the formal labor market sector produces net disutility (which could
in principle be positive or negative).
9This implies that a VAT increase could increase informality as it would become more attractive in comparison
to formal work. Section 4 will provide a more extensive discussion of this and other modeling choices.
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The household maximization problem in the first period (young, born at time t) is then:
V 1t = max
C1t ,δ
1
t ,ζ
1
t
u
(
Q1t
)
+ βV 2(A1t+1, P
1
t+1)
with
Q1t = C
1
t − ϕ¯1t
ϕ¯1t = ϕP (δ
1
t ) + δ
1
tϕF (ζ
1
t )
A1t+1 = Rt+1
(
y1t − (1 + τc)C1t
)
y1t = δ
1
t ζ
1
t (1− τw)w1l1 + (1− δ1t )z1 + δ1t (1− ζ1t )(z1 + (1 + τc)y1inf )
P 1t+1 = δ
1
t ζ
1
tm w
1l1
where u is the instantaneous utility of consumption, β < 1 represents the time discounting pref-
erence, A1t+1 are assets at the end of the period, P 1t+1 are (notional) pension rights accumulated
when working in the formal market, ϕ¯1t is the total disutility of working expressed in goods con-
sumption terms, ϕP is the disutility of participation, ϕF is the net disutility of working in the
formal market, Rt+1 = 1+rt+1 is the given gross interest rate, y1t is the average income in period
1, w1 is the wage rate in the formal sector, l1 are labor hours in the formal labor market, z1
are welfare benefits for non-participants, y1inf is the output from the informal sector with linear
production technology (constant labor, no capital) and m is a pension right accumulation factor.
The household maximization problem in the second period (old) for the same household is:
V 2(A1t+1, P
1
t+1) = max
C2
t+1
,δ2
t+1
,ζ2
t+1
u
(
Q2t+1
)
with
Q2t+1 = C
2
t+1 − ϕ¯2t+1
ϕ¯2t+1 = ϕP (δ
2
t+1) + δ
2
t+1ϕF (ζ
2
t+1)
0 = Rt+2
(
A1t+1 + y
2
t+1 − (1 + τc)C2t+1
)
y2t+1 = δ
2
t+1ζ
2
t+1(1− τw)w2l2 + (1− δ2t+1)P 2t+1,net + δ2t+1(1− ζ2t+1)(P 2t+1,net + (1 + τc)y2inf )
P 2t+1 = R
P
t+1P
1
t+1 + δ
2
t+1ζ
2
t+1m w
2l2
P 2t+1,net = ν P
2
t+1 + P0
where P 2t+1,net is the net pension payment, RPt+1 ≤ Rt+1 is a (notional) interest rate on pension
rights (which capture administration costs), ν is the conversion rate of pension rights P 2t+1 into
monetary payments and P0 is a anti-poverty pension (unrelated to earnings on the formal labor
market). The third line only states that there is no saving at the end of the second period and
that old households consume all their savings. Compared to period 1, the only difference is that
welfare benefits z1 are replaced by pension payments P 2t+1,net. As in period 1, government can
not make the difference between non-participants and black market participants, so both can
collect pension payments.
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2.4 Production
Goods: Goods from the formal sector and from the informal sector can not be distinguished.
They are perfect substitute for households. Because of this, they are sold at the same after-tax
price to households and informal market producers can keep the consumption tax proceeds. We
normalize units so that the formal market producer price of the good is 1. As a consequence,
the budget constraint of a household is expressed in the same manner, with or without informal
markets (e.g A1t+1 = Rτt+1
(
y1t − (1 + τc)C1t
)
).
We introduce the assumption that the goods from the informal market are immediately con-
sumed by households and are not used for investment or government consumption, hence private
consumption equals production (
∑
a C
a
inf =
∑
a Y
a
inf ).
10 This way consumption tax revenue
can be expressed in a simple way (see below). Although our single-good framework abstracts
from all sorts of heterogeneities, this assumption reflects the idea of a pattern where very small
firms tend to work informally and focus on consumption goods more extensively compared to
big firms which are more likely to operate formally and are in addition also responsible for the
production of investment goods. This could be motivated by an asymmetric information setting
where buyers cannot distinguish sellers and their goods, while the sellers have a preference for
selling their goods only to households, e.g. as there is a lower chance that illegal transactions
are detected by authorities. The chance of detection is however not explicitly modeled.
Note that informal sector producers can sell their good on the market and decide to save some of
their income. The assumption does not mean that informal sector producers consume all what
they produce. Being an informal market participant is a production characteristic of households,
not a consumption characteristic.
We denote by Yf the aggregate output from the formal market (the official GDP), Yinf the
aggregate output from the informal market and Y = Yf + Yinf the total output.
Formal market: Production in the formal market is identical to standard overlapping gener-
ations models. Firms take formal market labor supply Lf =
∑
a δ
aζaNala as given and define
investment level I to maximize firm value, facing quadratic capital adjustment costs J .
More specifically, production uses capital K and labor Lf using a Cobb-Douglas technology,
Yf = K
α(Lf )
1−α. Following Hayashi (1982), we assume that changes in capital is a costly
operation for firms, and use a quadratic specification for adjustment costs J = K(I/K − δ)2,
where δ is the capital depreciation rate. The capital law of motion is Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It.
Because the labor market is perfect, the after-tax wage (1− τw)w equals the marginal product of
labor. Firms take factor prices and labor supply as given and define investment I to maximize
firm value V , defined in a recursive fashion:
V (Kt) = max{Is}s=t,t+1,...
Yf
(
Kt, (Lf )t
)− wt (Lf )t − It − Jt(Kt, It) + 1Rt+1V (Kt+1)
This expression states that investments decision maximize the current period profits with the
discounted next present value of the firm in the next period.
Informal market: Labor supply on the informal market is unobserved and is assumed to
be constant: taxes are not perceived so they do not have the direct influence that they have on
10Empirical estimates of the size of shadow economies lead to a weighted mean of 36.5% of official GDP in
Europe and Central Asia according to Schneider et al. (2010). As informality is part but not all of the shadow
economy, activity related to informality should thus be no larger than 36.5% of GDP. Assuming that the output
of the informal sector is entirely consumed is thus realistic.
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working hours in the formal market. Production yainf uses a linear technology, with no capital and
constant labor supply (which we normalize to 1). Firms in the informal market can have any size.
When firms have size one, being an informal worker is equivalent to self-employement without
paying labor income taxes but collecting welfare benefits . Because productivity and labor supply
in the informal market are not observed, we do not decompose yainf into its production factors
(e.g. yainf = productivity × labor supply)11.
Even though production factors are not observed (and not handled in the model), yainf plays a
role in the model, as it defines the value of participating in the informal labor market.
The aggregate output from the informal market Yinf is simply:
Yinf =
∑
a
Y ainf =
∑
a
δat (1− ζat )Nat yainf
2.5 Government
We assume that the government can not observe informal market activity. In particular, the
government can not make the difference between non-participation and informal labor market
participation. As a result, both non-participants and informal market participants can claim
the same welfare benefits z1 when young. When retired, households who occasionally did not
participate in the labor market and households who occasionally participated in the informal
market, or both, can make claims on pensions in a similar fashion, with a flat part P0 and an
(formal) earnings related part. Government receives no labor income tax from informal labor
market participants.
Since formal market and informal market goods can not be distinguished, government can not
raise consumption tax revenue from the informal market. Informal market producers, selling
goods at the same after-tax price, keep the tax revenue for themselves12.
Compared to a model without informality, only total consumption tax revenue is different. It is
equal to:
τc
(∑
a
NaCa − Yinf
)
≡ τc (C − Yinf )
since output in the informal market equals consumption at every point in time (see above).
We assume that government balances its budget at every period (using any of the tax rates or
government consumption as closing instrument), so that tax revenues equal expenditures:
τc (C − Yinf ) + τw
(∑
a
δaζaNawala
)
= CG+N1
(
(1− δ1) + δ1(1− ζ1)) z1 +N2 ((1− δ2) + δ2(1− ζ2))P 2net
2.6 Equilibrium
We assume a small open economy which takes the international interest rate rt as given. The
goods market will not clear and the trade balance TB will vary with household decisions so that
foreign assets will be accumulated. The trade balance takes into account informal market goods,
11In the complete model, we will assume exogenous labor productivity growth. Then, we will assume that
productivity in the informal market grows at the same rate as in the formal market. As a consequence, we can
detrend informal labor market variables as for the formal labor market.
12We also assume that savings of informal market participants are stored as for formal market participants,
and earn the same after-tax returns. Informal market participants thus pay capital income taxes.
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since these can not be distinguished and needs to purchased by households:
TB = Y − C − CG− I − J
Foreign assets DF keep track of accumulation in trade balance positions:
DFt+1 = Rt+1(DFt + TBt).
3 Full scale model for evaluations13
The retirement and informality model from section 2 is too simple for policy relevant analysis, as
several components are missing. We will add informality to a full scale overlapping generations
model in the same way it was done for the simple Diamond-Samuelson model. The existing full
scale model is described in details in Berger et al. (2009) and has already been used for various
policy reform analysis, including tax and pension reforms. We present the main additional
characteristics of this model below and focus on the most important components for the project.
Uncertainty in life duration and age-dependent mortality rates are used, to better capture the
effect of population aging. Because of a search friction, labor markets are imperfect and workers
who decided to participate in the formal labor market may remain unemployed, in which case they
perceive unemployment benefits. If they decide to participate in the informal markets, households
are never unemployed14. Households take labor supply decisions along several margins, on top
of participation, retirement and informality: how many hours to supply on the formal market,
depending on social security contributions and labor income taxes; how many hours to search
when unemployed; how much time to spend in education before entering the labor market; how
many hours to invest in continuous training while working. As a result of initial education
decisions, households have one of three skill levels, providing different wage levels. Figure 2
illustrates the chain of decision making of households concerning labor supply.
Figure 2: Labor market decisions in the full scale model
participate?
work how hard
matching
how
yes yes
yes
no
no no not very hard
very hard
manynot many
get hour dependent
get unemployment benefits
get welfare plus informal incomeget welfare
formally? to search?
to supply?
decides
job is found:
many hours
technology
whether a
after-tax wage income
13Except for the new figure 2 and the last two paragraphs, identical to the second interim report, dated 12
October 2012.
14From the point of view of government and the model, unemployment in the informal sector corresponds to
non-participation.
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Government collects taxes on several fronts, including labor income taxes, social security con-
tributions on workers’ and firms’ side, capital income taxes, firing taxes, firm profit taxes and
consumption taxes. It provides different types of social insurance and benefits, such as welfare
benefits, unemployment insurance, training or investment subsidies. Government also admin-
istrates a pay-as-you-go pension system and provides small or strong incentives for postponed
retirement, such as more than proportional increases in pension benefits for delayed retirement.
Health expenditures are assumed to be constant per capita (potentially age-dependent) and
covered by the government budget.
Pensions are modeled with two parts and financed by a pay-as-you-go system. There are flat
payments to retired workers, unrelated to labor market history and suitable to fight poverty in
old age. There are earnings-related payments, which depend on the amount of pension rights
accumulated throughout the (formal) working life. Pension rights are accrued at a rate comprised
between inflation and total labor productivity growth. The rate is a policy parameter and can
be different for households in age of working and households in retirement. As this parameter is
important, we will refer to values in Poland and Slovakia during the reforms simulations in section
6. Households are free to save while young in order to finance more consumption after retirement
than what pension payments alone allow. There are however no specific policy instruments to
encourage private savings dedicated to retirement financing, so the model does not capture third-
pillar pensions. We however make sure to calibrate the model so that total pension expenditures
match aggregate multi-pillar data. There is no mechanism in the model to tie pension payments
to demographic variables.
There are two sources of variation in labor productivity: exogenous technological progress and
endogenous training decisions. Employed workers in the formal sector decide how much time
to devote to work and how much time to training. The more the training, the higher the labor
productivity. In a steady-state equilibrium, training decisions vary over the life-cyle but are
constant in average, so that average labor supply grows at the technological progress rate. We
will refer to this rate as the growth trend. Because pension rights accumulate at a rate which is
(partly) indexed to total labor productivity, the growth trend plays a role in financing of pension
systems.
4 Discussion of informality modeling
We now present a discussion of the implications of the modeling of informality in the simple and
full scale models. As with every model, it is simpler than reality. In general, choices have been
made to focus on parts of informality which are most relevant for public finances.
We start by an illustration of the effect of adding informality to existing models, discussing
impacts on the labor market. We then discuss the analysis which can be done with the model,
followed by a discussion of the analysis which can not be done. We also mention the impact that
the modeling choices are likely to have on the results.
When adding informality, what is the impact on the (formal sector) labor market? Compared to
a model without informality, wages in the (formal) labor market have one more reason to vary
with households decisions, namely informality decisions. Without informality, (formal sector)
wages are impacted by consumption decisions (how much to save impacts capital formation, the
capital-effective labor ratio and thus the marginal product of labor), participation and hours
decisions (how much effective labor is provided impacts the capital-effective labor ratio). These
decisions are in turned defined by preferences and institutions. For instance, labor income taxes
12
reduce both participation and hours provided. With informality, wages are also impacted by
sector decisions. If more households choose to participate in the formal sector, effective labor
supply in the formal sector is increased, the capital-effective labor ratio declines, the marginal
product of labor declines and (formal sector) wages decline. The discussion of simulation results
in section 6 will illustrate the importance of this phenomenon.
We now continue with a discussion of what (new) analysis can be done with the model, once
informality has been added. The model is suitable for the analysis of the relationships between
informality and public policy. For instance, an increase in the pension benefits (via ν in the
simple model) increases the incentive for participation in the formal labor market (ζa), the labor
income tax base and thus government revenue. At the same time, pension expenditures increase,
a direct negative impact on government budget. The overall net effect on the government budget
is thus ambiguous and simulations will allow to identify and quantify it. Another example is
a decrease in labor income tax rate (τw) or social security contributions (full scale model). It
also increases the incentive for participation in the formal market, increase the tax base but the
reduction in the rate has a negative effect on government revenue. Again the overall net effect
on public finances is ambiguous and simulations can identify and quantify it.
Section 6 will be more specific on the policy reforms which will be considered with the full scale
model.
The model however is not suitable for a detailed analysis of informality alone, in particular its
production process. For instance, we can not estimate the impact of technological progress on
the informality rate, as we assume that production in the informal sector uses a linear technology
with effective labor and no capital, effective labor growing at the same rate as in the formal sector
(at constant training decisions).
The model does not capture direct government interventions to reduce informality, such as anti-
fraud controls. These interventions are costly but can influence the household decisions to join
the formal or informal sector, and thus government tax revenue. Costs and benefits analysis are
thus relevant. The model could be extended to capture these direct government interventions.
As such however, it can not estimate their effects.
A related simplification of the model is the assumption that all informal market participants
collect welfare benefits, as the government cannot make the distinction between non-participants
and informal market participants. In reality, informal market participants may prefer to ignore
welfare benefits, especially if governments have anti-informality fraud measures. However, we
believe that the assumption that informal labor market participants will collect the flat part of
pension benefits, once retired, is realistic. Our simulations may thus overestimate the welfare
benefit costs of informality. Given the limited weight of welfare benefit costs in aggregate public
expenditures and the fact that population aging puts pressure on pension expenditures rather
than welfare benefits, we believe that the bias is small.
Since we address informal rather than shadow economies, we neglect the impact of underreporting
of economic activity. We thus do not simulate the effect of public policy change on reporting of
income and associated government tax revenue. A model extension would be required to perform
such simulations.
The last noteworthy simplification of the informality modeling is the assumption that informal
sector participants sell their products on the same market as formal sector participants; that
goods of the two sectors are indistinguishable; that informal market participants can keep the
consumption taxes for themselves. In reality, some of the goods from the informal market can
be distinguished. For instance, whether cigarettes are purchased on the black market or not may
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be clear in some cases (e.g. purchases on the street). Because there is a risk that the product is
of poorer quality, consumers may pay a lower price for identified informal sector goods. Informal
market producers may thus sell at a lower price than formal market producers. Depending on
the calibration procedure, we may thus be giving an unjustified higher value to informal sector
work, and overestimate the public finance costs of informality. Our calibration approach is based
on actual earnings reports, presented in appendix A.3, and avoids this problem.
Finally, we present a limitation which is not particular to our modeling of informality, but applies
to most general equilibrium analysis of public finance. General equilibrium models rest on the
assumption of perfect foresight: households can anticipate the impact of their current actions
on their entire future. In reality, it may not be the case. Myopia is one justification for the
implementation of mandatory pension savings. We shall see in section 6.1 that population aging
alone, without any reform, reduces the informality rate. The reason is the following. With a
constant retirement age, having good income after retirement becomes more and more important
as life expectancy increases; formal earnings-related pension payments are higher, increasing the
attractiveness of formal sector participation. If households are really myopic, they will ignore
the increase in life expectancy and the increased attractiveness of the formal sector. The caveat
of perfect foresight however applies for decision in every labor market margin, not just formal
sector participation, and is not considered to be a major setback. One should however keep it in
mind.
5 Calibration15
In this section we summarize the calibration procedure. It is based on the calibration strategy
designed and presented in the first interim report. The actual procedure is consistent with this
strategy although some adjustments were made. Details are presented in appendix A.
Informality rates are taken from Koettl and Weber (2012). Because age and income classes in
this paper and in the model are very similar but not identical, we establish simple correspondence
rules.
We use household-level data to calibrate income in the informal sector. With one minor exception,
we use the same criteria as in Koettl and Weber (2012) to identify informal workers. As earnings
data is lacking for Slovakia, we partially rely on estimates for Poland for that country and verify
consistency with data from another transition country. We calibrate the earnings profile and
levels such that differences between informal workers are consistent with data, along age and
skill dimensions, and such that the premium for working in the formal sector as opposed to
the informal sector is consistent with data. The resulting weighted averages of the formal sector
premiums are 1.157 for the model and 1.169 in the data for Poland and similar values for Slovakia.
Parameters of the net disutility of working in the formal sector ϕF (ζ) define household behavior
with respect to informality, when there are policy or economic environment variations. House-
holds may decide to increase participation in the informal sector if social security contributions
are increased, for instance. Calibration will define to which extent they do, ceteris paribus. We
use the empirical estimate in Koettl and Weber (2012) as calibration target. For instance, they
find that a 1 percentage point increase in the so-called formalization tax rate (FTR) is associated
with an average decrease of 1.1% of the probability of working in the formal sector. The study
also identifies a stronger reaction of low income earners, about twice larger than the average.
15Identical to the revised second interim report, dated 12 October 2012.
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Together with actual informality rate by age and skill class, this information deliver parameter
values for ϕF (ζ). The calibration results in equilibrium responses of 1.6%, 1.1% and 0.7% for
the low16, medium and high skills in Slovakia and similar values for Poland.
Population aging in the model is calibrated to match the long run medium forecasts of United
Nations (2011). We target the population size and the age structure, changing mortality rates and
population inflow parameters. The latter comprise newborns and immigrants together. Mortality
rates pin down the age structure and inflows the population size. In reality, populations do not
stop growing or shrinking. Computable General Equilibrium models however need to start
and finish with stationary steady-state equilibrium. Compromises thus need to be made but
approximations are of good quality. The final steady state was calibrated to approximately
reflect the population projections for 2100.
For parameters unrelated to informality and population aging, we use the same calibration
procedure as the full-scale model without informality Berger et al. (2009). Because of informality,
outcomes are different for formal sector wages, which are higher. This difference is however
without any consequence as the level of wages is never interpreted, only their variations.
6 Results
This section presents and discusses the results of the simulation. We start with the effect of aging
without any reform and continue with the joint effect of aging and reforms. We finish with a
summary of the analysis. Appendix B is a reminder of the reform analysis goals. Tables 1 and 2
provide an overview of the cases and reforms that we consider, in accordance with the appendix.
Tables 3 and 4 collect the results for a selection of interesting cases. Appendix C contains
the results for the rest of the reforms considered. Numbers in the first column present the
current status. Numbers in the second column present the long run effects which approximately
reflect the year 2100, taking into account population aging but without any reforms. Subsequent
columns report outcomes in the various cases and reforms. For a reason that we will explain,
the simulated effect of aging and reforms on informality is stronger in Slovakia than in Poland.
Qualitative outcomes are however identical. We will use numbers from the Slovakia cases when
discussing outcomes, because effects are more visible and for ease of reading. Comments however
apply to both countries.
16Note that in contrast to Koettl and Weber (2012) who separately estimate effects on informality choices for
the low income earners, which are defined as persons earning about one third of the average wage, the low-skill
workers in the model earn about 70% of the average wage. This explains why the responsiveness was reduces
accordingly.
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Table 1: Cases and reforms considered
Code Cases and reforms Magnitude
Basic reforms
r0 Aging Pure population aging until 2100, no reforms -
r56 Const HC Aging, no reforms, constant human capital decisions -
r57 Const Inf Aging, no reforms, constant informality decisions -
r59 Const r57 + r57 + constant retirement decisions -
r192 +2 years Increase in retirement age of 2 years 2 years
r34 SSC+ Increase of social security contribution rates 3% GDP
r334 SSC- Decrease of social security contribution rates 3% GDP
r24 Pen- Decrease in pension benefits 3% GDP
r324 Pen+ Increase in pension benefits 3% GDP
r27 Pen flat- Decrease in flat part of pension benefits 3% GDP
r327 Pen flat+ Increase in flat part pension benefits 3% GDP
r29 Pen Ear- Decrease in earnings-related part of pension benefits 3% GDP
r329 Pen Ear+ Increase in earnings-related part of pension benefits 3% GDP
r101 Welfare- Decrease in welfare benefits (non-participant income) 0.5% GDP
r106 Welfare+ Increase in welfare benefits (non-participant income) 0.5% GDP
r81 IncTax+ Increase in labor income taxes 3% GDP
r86 IncTax- Decrease in labor income taxes 3% GDP
r91 VAT+ Increase in consumption taxes 3% GDP
r96 VAT- Decrease in consumption taxes 3% GDP
r70 g+ Increase in exogenous productivity growth rate 20%
r71 g- Decrease in exogenous productivity growth rate 20%
Additional reforms
r603 CapTax+ Increase in capital income taxes 3% GDP
r204 +4 years,
HC0
Increase in retirement age of 4 years, const human
capital
4 years
r199 +8 years Increase in retirement age of 8 years 8 years
r52 W Pen Acc- Reduction on accrual rate of pension rights, workers -50%
r53 Pen Acc- Reduction on accrual rate of pension rights, all -50%
Note: all reforms take place with the same population aging as in r0; reforms magnitude in general: 3% of
initial GDP; under constant human capital decisions (r56), constant informality decisions (r57) and constant
human capital, informality and retirement decisions (r59), workers still continue to take training decisions in the
formal sector; social security changes on firms and households (r34, r334); r199 reform ignores informality.
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Table 2: Cases and reforms considered - combined reforms
Code Cases and reforms Magnitude
Combination of reforms
r1002 Pen flat+,
Welfare-
Increase in flat part pension benefits (r327) + Decrease
in welfare benefits (r101)
See table 1
r1011 Pen flat+,
VAT+
Increase in flat part pension benefits (r327) + Increase
in consumption taxes (r91)
See table 1
r1101 +2 years,
Welfare-
Increase in retirement age of 2 years (r192) + Decrease
in welfare benefits (r101)
See table 1
r1021 Pen Ear-,
IncTax-
Decrease in earnings-related part of pension benefits
(r29) + Decrease in labor income taxes (r86)
See table 1
r1221 +2y, Pen
Ear-,
IncTax-
Increase in retirement age of 2 years (r192) + Decrease
in earnings-related part of pension benefits (r29) +
Decrease in labor income taxes (r86)
See table 1
r1301 IncTax-,
VAT+
Decrease in labor income taxes (r86) + Increase in
consumption taxes (r91)
See table 1
r1400 +2y, Pen
Ear-,
CapTax-
Increase in retirement age of 2 years (r192) + Decrease
in earnings-related part of pension benefits + Decrease
in capital income taxes
2 years,
1% GDP,
1% GDP
r1500 +8 years,
Pen Acc-
Increase in retirement age of 8 years (r199) + 25%
reduction on accrual rate of pension rights
8 years,
-25%
Note: all reforms take place with the same population aging as in r0; reforms magnitude in general: 3% of
initial GDP; r1400 reform only for Poland, as capital income taxes are too low in Slovakia for significant
decrease; r1500 reform ignoring informality.
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Table 3: Overview of selected long run simulation results for Slovakia
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Table 4: Overview of selected long run simulation results for Poland
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6.1 Effects of aging
Consistent with previous economic analyzes, the simulation predicts an increase in the social
security deficit, driven by pension expenditures. In constant population terms, the social security
budget starts from a balanced position and would reach 6.3% of GDP by 2100, while the pension
budget deficit17 would reach 5.4%. The reason is standard. Although workers spontaneously
decide to retire later to finance consumption in old age, the change is small (average retirement
age of 58.2 instead of 58). Due to population aging, households die less at a young age and are
more likely to survive until and past the retirement age. With essentially constant retirement
age, the number of contributors to the pension system increases slower (even shrinks) than the
number of beneficiaries, creating a deficit.
A more striking, novel and surprising result is the reduction of the informality rate due to
population aging and without any reform. The informality rate drops from 12.7% to 9.3%.
Two supplementary effects explain the drop. The first effect is related to the increase in life
expectancy. At constant or near constant retirement age, the longer households live, the more
important the post-retirement segment of their life, the more important to have high pension
benefits. Informality gives access to the flat part but not the earnings-related part of benefits.
Participation in the formal sector thus become more attractive as life expectancy increases. The
second effect is related to human capital. As the probability of dying young decreases, it is
more beneficial for workers to train and increase productivity over the life-cycle in the formal
sector: the likelihood of dying before benefits from these investments are reaped is lower. As
productivity increases, wages in the formal sector increase, followed by social contributions and
later pension benefits. Participation in the formal sector becomes overall more attractive.
A related finding is the shift in skill composition of the population: the share of high skills
decrease from 15.8% to 13.1% of the population. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume
that high skill workers retire later and have a lower disutility of working and training18. Formal
high skill workers have a higher incentive to train and their productivity increases more. Even
though continuous training takes time away from productive work, the increase in productivity is
large enough that effective hours increase. In general equilibrium and before education decisions
are made, a labor supply increase for constant demand leads to a reduction in formal sector
wages. Changes in wages in the constant decision case (column r59) show indeed that wages for
the high skill drop by 1.2%. Before entering the labor market, young adults are then more likely
to choose a medium-skill education.
Simulations keeping skill constant (column r56) further illustrate the role of human capital in
informality decisions. When skills are constant, the informality rate further drops to 7.6%. High
skill workers continue to train more over the life-cycle. Their productivity keeps increasing. In
contrast to the general case, labor supply in the formal sector in every skill class is modified by
the informality decisions alone, not by initial education decisions. In particular, formal sector
17We consider that social security expenditures include pensions, unemployment insurance and health insurance.
Welfare benefits are included in the general budget. Social security contributions (SSC) often make not distinction
between pensions, unemployment insurance and health insurance. We arbitrarily allocate SSC revenue to the
various social security budgets on the basis of expenditures for illustration purposes. The difference between the
social security budget deficit and the pension budget deficit is then a pure accounting artifact. The reference
remains the social security budget deficit.
18Recall that human capital has two dimensions in the model: initial education decisions defining the skill level
for the rest of life (low, medium and high), resulting in 3 different initial productivity levels; continuous training
decisions over the life-cycle for further improvements in productivity.
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labor supply for the medium skills is only increased by informal sector workers and there is no
increase due to education decisions shifting from high to medium skill training. Compared to
the general case, the positive labor supply shock is smaller and equilibrium wages for medium
skills decrease less. Wages and pension payments are thus even more attractive when skills are
constant than when skills vary for the medium skill workers. The informality rate for medium skill
workers thus decreases more. As three quarters of the population has medium skills, the average
informality rate drops further. The simulation with constant skills thus predicts that informality
rate should drop significantly more (down to 7.6%) as a result of aging than in the general case
(down to 9.3%). It illustrates the overestimation bias introduced by macroeconomic analysis
without endogenous skill decisions: if one neglects endogenous skill decisions, one would predict
a decline in informality to 7.6%, when a more complete and realistic model with endogenous skill
decisions predicts a decline to 9.3% only.
Another potentially surprising finding is that informality does not lead to larger social security
deficits over the long run. Simulations using constant informality (column r57) indeed show
that the deficit would reach 6.19% of GDP in constant population terms, lower than the 6.27%
figure of the general case with endogenous informality decisions. One could expect that informal
workers are a net drag on social security finances, since they do not contribute but can claim
the basic welfare benefits of non-participants. The experiments shows that this is not the case.
Although they do not contribute to financing, informal participants only receive non-earnings
related benefits, which are lower than average earnings-related benefits. This is a result of the
strong earnings-related link present in the pension systems of Poland ans Slovakia. From a long
run public finance point of view, the immediate benefit of lower informality are higher social
security contributions and its price higher expenditures from larger benefits at a later stage.
Comparison of outcomes in Poland and Slovakia deliver another interesting finding, to be treated
with caution. The effect of population aging on the informality rate is much smaller in Poland
than in Slovakia. In the first country, the informality rate drops by 2%, in relative terms (from
33.2% to 32.6%). In the second, it drops by 36% (from 12.7% to 9.3%). This difference is mainly
due to the data on informality and its impact on the calibration procedure. Reliable data on
informality is difficult to gather, due to its nature. Data shows that the informality rate was
on average 33% in Poland and 13% in Slovakia, in 2010. Differences across skills classes were
even larger: for instance, the rate was close to 50% in Poland but below 15% in Slovakia among
low-skilled households (see appendix A.1 for more). The earnings premium for formal sector
participation is however similar in the two countries. Net disutility of formality is not observed
but calibrated so that the model predicts the correct informality rate in 2010 (ϕF in the model
presented in section 2). To reconcile premium and participation data, net disutility must be
higher in Poland than in Slovakia. In formal market participation decisions, these psychological
costs drive a wedge between the monetary values of formal and informal market participation.
Loosely speaking, Poles have a much higher distaste for work in the formal sector than Slovaks,
at comparable monetary benefits.
The net disutility function is calibrated to match 2010 informality rates and so that it predicts
correct informality variations for observed policy shocks, which are small by nature (see appendix
A.4 for details). When shocks are larger, such as population aging over 50 years, predictions
in the variation of the informality rate are only precise if the net disutility costs are precisely
calibrated. Because 2010 informality rates are so different between Poland and Slovakia, the
net disutility costs are very different and the predictions for large policy shocks will be very
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different19.
The conclusion is that qualitative results are fully reliable but one should be more cautious with
quantitative results on informality rates. One can safely compare informality rate outcomes
across countries in qualitative terms, but should exert caution with quantitative terms. One
should also be careful with quantitative predictions on the effect of a single policy or demographic
shock on the informality rate. Comparison across two or more shocks in the same country can
however be made both in qualitative and quantitative terms, since the bias in the net disutility
calibration is identical.
6.2 Effects of basic reforms
We focus the discussion on the effect of reforms on social security deficits and the role of informal-
ity, considering more standard outcomes at the end. Opposite reforms have opposite effects. For
instance, an increase in social security contributions (column r34 of table 3) increases informality
while a decrease in contributions (column r334 of table 16 in appendix C) decreases informality.
For this reason20, we only discuss results in table 3.
6.2.1 Reforms and informality
Most of the reforms impact the informality rate in a way that is intuitively expected, but not
all. As one could expect, the informality rate increases with higher social security contributions
(column r34), higher consumption taxes (column r91) and lower earnings-related pension benefits
(column r29) but decreases with lower welfare benefits (column r101) and lower flat pension
benefits (column r27). The increase in informality (relative to the pure aging no-reform case,
column r0) due to the increase in the effective retirement age (column r192) may be more of
a surprise. The negative impact on informality that higher growth (column r70) has may also
come as a surprise to some, although effects may be unclear a priori to others.
Before starting the discussion of the effects of reforms, we make a note on informality rates and
formal sector employment. When all other labor supply margins are constant, an increase in
informality is mechanically associated with a decrease in effective formal employment (yearly
hours per capita). In tables 3 and 4, this is the case for all reforms except the increase in
retirement age (column r192).
When social security contributions increases, the benefits from working in the formal sector are
maintained but the price to have access to these benefits increase, making work in the informal
sector more attractive. Informality then increases (14.6% compared to 9.3% in the pure aging,
no-reform case). Higher consumption taxes not only decrease the incentive to provide labor
in the formal sector, a standard taxation theory effect (average 1776 yearly hours per worker
instead of 1785), decreasing the value of formal sector participation, but also directly increase
19Unreported simulations show that a larger wedge in Slovakia reduces informality rate variations, confirming
the role of the net disutility of formal sector participation. When the formal sector earnings premium of the
high-skilled in Slovakia is increased to the level of Poland (which increases the overall formal sector premium
while keeping the informality rate in 2010 constant, thus increasing the calibrated net disutility of formal work
in Slovakia), population aging reduces informality from 12.7% to 11.2%, a 14% drop which is significantly lower
than the 36% drop predicted in the baseline case.
20The results of an overall pension benefits increase (r24) and those of a labor income tax increase (r81) are
two exceptions. We do not discuss the first case because, as expected, results are intermediates between results
of flat part benefits increases (r27) and earnings-related part benefits increases (r29). The r24 reform is indeed a
combination of r27 and r29 reforms. We do not discuss the second case because, as expected, it has similar effects
as a SSC increase (r34). Increases in labor income taxes and consumption taxes indeed have a similar impact on
households labor supply decisions, with or without informality. Both decrease the attractiveness of the (formal)
labor supply and consumption bundle and increase the value of outside options, be it leisure or informal work.
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the value of informal sector participation. Indeed, the model assumes that informal workers
sell their product on the same market as formal workers, charge the same price but do not
have to transfer the consumption tax proceeds to the government. As informal workers can
keep the consumption taxes for themselves, the value of informal sector participation increases
even more. As a result, informality increases (13.3%). Pension benefits have two parts: a flat
part, lower in value and which all households can collect, and an earning-related part, which
depends on rights accumulated through formal sector participation. When the earnings-related
part is decreased, the value of formal sector relative to informal sector participation decreases, so
informality increases (14.2%). When the flat part is decreased, it is the opposite and informality
drops (8.1%). A similar phenomenon takes place with decreases in welfare benefits. As the
government can not distinguish between non-participants and informal sector participants, both
can collect welfare benefits. Decreases in welfare benefits thus make both options less attractive
and boost formal sector participation so that the informality rate drops (4.3%). Note that it
also decreases the value of outside options for formal workers, during wage negotiations with
employers. As the relative value loss is bigger for low-skilled than medium- and high-skilled,
their bargaining position is most weakened, explaining why labor costs decrease most for them
(14% loss).
Compared to the pure aging no-reform case, the increase in informality due to later retirement
age can appear as a surprise (9.7% instead of 9.3%). Recall that one of the reason for the drop
in informality due to aging alone was related to human capital: as the likelihood of dying young
decreases, investing in training is more interesting, so that productivity, wages, earnings-related
pension benefits and then formality increase. One could think that the benefits of training are
even larger with later retirement age, since the higher productivity benefits can be reaped over a
longer working period, which could make formal sector work even more attractive than informal
sector work. There is however a simple mechanical counteracting effect. Informality rates are
larger for older than younger workers (in Slovakia, initial weighted average formality rates by age
group are 0.91, 0.92, 0.87, 0.86, 0.84, from younger to older). Retiring later thus mechanically
increases the informality rate, in relative terms, undoing some of the changes due to aging and
training.
A higher exogenous productivity growth (yearly 1.45% increase instead of 1.2% over the total
period, 2010 to 2100) leads to an increase in informality (14.4% compared to the 9.3%, pure
aging case). The simulation shows that informality becomes more interesting. The main reason
is related to regulation on pension indexation. Pensions benefits are partly indexed to wage and
thus productivity growth (50% in Slovakia, 20% in Poland). Rewards to work in the formal and
informal sectors are however fully indexed to productivity growth. Higher growth thus makes
the benefit of formal work less interesting (since pensions grow less), increasing the relative value
of informal sector work. A counterfactual experiment where pension indexation for retirees is
doubled, on top of higher productivity, leads to a large relative drop in informality (11.0% instead
of 14.4%).
6.2.2 Reforms and social security financing
As one might expect, postponement of retirement age (column r192), increases in social security
contributions (column r34), decreases in the flat part or the earnings-related part of pension
benefits (columns r27 and r29), increases in exogenous productivity growth (column r70) all
lead to an improvement in the financing of social security, relative to the pure aging, no reform
case (column r0). In some of these cases, the magnitude of the gain may be surprising. The
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fact that decreases in welfare benefits (column r101) worsen the social security deficit may be
unexpected but there is a simple accounting explanation. Cuts in welfare benefits improve
financial sustainability. Increases of consumption taxes (column r91) have very little effect on
the deficit, slightly increasing it in Slovakia and slightly decreasing it in Poland.
Postponing the retirement age by 2 years decreases the social security deficit relative to the
no reform case (4.5% of initial GDP instead of 5.1%). The decrease is however limited by the
larger relative drop in wages for the low skill formal workers (5.3% drop instead of 3.5%), which
decreases social security contributions revenue. The drop in wages is due to a general equilibrium
effect: many low skill workers join the formal sector, resulting in a strong labor supply shock
and drop in wages. The decrease is also limited by the fact that 2 years is not a large figure,
compared to the 9 years increase in life expectancy between 2010 and 2100.
Increases in social security contribution rates reduce the social security deficit in a moderate
fashion, while decreases in flat and earnings-related parts of pension benefits all lead to significant
improvements (respectively drop from 5.1% of GDP to 3.3%, 1.5% and 1.5%). Because of the
increase in the informality rate, average pensions per beneficiary drop when contributions are
increased, an aggregate 0.9% of GDP saving (compared to the no reform case). In relative terms,
contributions increases add up to 0.8% of GDP more revenue. Most of the gains from decreasing
pension benefits come from the targeted aggregate expenditures reduction. Decreasing the flat
part also improves formality, leading to extra revenue. Decreasing the earnings-related part,
although it increases informality and reduce revenue, leads to a larger decrease in aggregate
pension expenditures, as labor supply in the formal sector, earnings and thus pension benefits
drop more.
An increase in productivity growth leads to a very modest improvement in the social security
deficit (4.4% of initial GDP instead of 5.1%; 7.25% of actual GDP instead of 7.36%). With larger
productivity, pensions relative to current wages decline, because pension rights grow at a slower
pace than wages and productivity (partial indexation). In relative terms, aggregate pension
expenditures are thus lower and social security financing improves. However, the increase in
informality wipes away most of these gains, as less contributions are collected.
With lower welfare benefits, the social security deficit slightly increases (5.11% of GDP instead
of 5.08%), but government consumption per capita has to decrease less (-52.5% instead of -
56%). The reason is that welfare benefits are not counted as social security expenditures. The
relevant measure is thus the change in government consumption per capita, which shows that
lower welfare benefits improves the financial sustainability of public expenditures.
Changes in consumption taxes have a small and mixed impact on social security deficits (5.16% of
GDP instead of 5.09% in Slovakia, 11.15% of GDP instead of 11.25% in Poland). Both aggregate
pension expenditures and social security contributions decline because of the increase in infor-
mality, two opposite effects on the financing of the social security system which essentially cancel
out. The increase in consumption taxes revenue materializes in the overall government budget
but not in the social security budget, so it contains unreported additional benefits. Changes
in government consumption per capita are an indirect measure of the benefit of reforms on the
entire government budget. They however show that consumption taxes usually deliver more
benefits on the total budget than most other reforms, but in a limited fashion (decrease of 47%
compared to 56% in case of no reform) and less than pension benefit reductions (decreases of
only 20%).
Comparing the various cases, one conclusion is that single dimension reforms may not be suf-
ficient. None of the reforms considered is able to restore financial sustainability of the social
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security system in a politically realistic fashion. The most effective measures are pension benefit
cuts but they may weaken protection against old-age poverty too much. Moreover, cuts would
have to be even larger to fully restore financial sustainability. Increases in social security contri-
butions or consumption taxes help but are insufficient to restore financial sustainability. Welfare
benefits cuts have even more limited impacts. Increases in retirement age also help but needs
to be larger to restore financial sustainability. Section 6.3 will investigate the effect of larger
increases in retirement age. Whatever the policy goals, it is safe to conclude that light measures
will not be able to secure financing of the social security system over the long run. We will
provide a more comprehensive comparison of the various reform options when discussing policy
implications, in section 7.
6.2.3 Other analysis of reforms
Reforms have the standard impact on the (formal) labor market. Higher taxes and contribu-
tions (columns r34, r91) and lower benefits (columns r29, r101) decrease the attractiveness of
(formal) work. Effective employment, unemployment rate and (formal) GDP variations reflect
the corresponding changes in household labor supply on the formal sector.
The impact of aging and reforms on pensions per beneficiary and consumption per capita combine
standard labor supply reactions in the formal sector with changes in informality rates. The
combination of these reactions are sometimes nontrivial, but not always.
In almost all cases, pension payments to former high-skill workers rise more (or drop less) than
payments to medium- and low-skill workers. For instance, high-skill retiree payments increase
34% (compared to the growth trend) when retirement age is increased 2 years (column r192),
while they only increase 4% for medium-skill retirees and less than 2% for low-skill retirees. These
relative differences are driven by the impacts on the labor market. As labor costs and wages
increase more for high-skill (see subsection 6.1), the earnings-related part of pension benefits
increase more for them. Cuts in earnings-related pensions (column r29) confirms the role of
policy: in this case, the size of the gain of the high-skilled, relative to the low- and medium-
skilled, is smaller.
Compared to some other studies, the drop in consumption per capita due to aging is limited.
In some cases, there is even a gain. When there is no reform, total consumption per capita
is essentially stable and consumption of formal goods per capita increases. The second finding
is easy to explain, as informality drops. The first is more unusual. It comes from households
behavior and a technical component of the analysis. In spite of the drop of labor supply brought
by a constant retirement age and the increase in life expectancy, total consumption per capita is
maintained because households change their saving behavior. They save more (34% increase in
private assets in Slovakia, 9% in Poland, the difference coming from different patience parameters)
to finance consumption after retirement. This increase in savings in the long run delivers more
capital income, compensating the drop in labor income and allowing to maintain consumption.
One technical component of the current analysis is the government budget closure. Over the
long run government debt would explode if the budget deficit increased forever. We therefore
assume constant government debt, by automatic changes of one policy instrument, unrelated
to any reform. In the analysis performed here, we chose to adjust government consumption to
balance the government budget. Other instruments can be chosen21. Each have advantages and
disadvantages. One benefit of using government consumption as closing instrument is that it
21For example, if the government budget was closed with lump-sum taxes, results would not change except that
the decrease in government consumption would be shifted to private consumption.
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leads to no direct distortion of households behaviors. One can isolate the impact of aging and
reforms on household behavior. One drawback is that it can be unrealistic. For instance, aging
leads to a drop of more than 50% of government consumption per capita.
Closing with taxes is more realistic but does not allow to isolate the effect of aging and reforms.
In these cases, higher taxes generally decrease labor supply, output and thus consumption per
capita. Tables 18 and 19 in appendix B provide the results of the simulations in Slovakia when
the budget is closed with consumption taxes. As expected, households reduce labor supply
on the formal sector (average 1755 yearly hours instead of 1785 when closing with government
consumption, in the pure aging case, column r0). For the same reasons as reform r91, households
increase participation in the informal market (informality increases to 25% instead of reducing
to 9%). As a consequence, formal sector GDP per capita decreases more. While government
consumption per capita is now stable, the reduction in labor supply reduces total consumption per
capita. As a consequence of the increase in informality rates, pension expenditures decrease and
so does the social security deficit. In general, closing the government budget with consumption
taxes adds the effects of reform r91 to the reform considered. In particular, the informality rates
are simply shifted up. In some occasions, the combination of effects is different from a simple
addition. These differences however remain of second order. For instance, informality after a
decrease in earnings-related pension benefits (r29) is lower than in the no reform case (r0), not
higher. This comes from the fact that the relative decrease in consumption taxes impacts workers
and retirees and formal sector workers compensate by increasing labor supply.
We finish this section with a discussion of the effect of exogenous productivity increases. In
absolute terms, total consumption per capita reaches increases 8.4% more under large produc-
tivity increases (column r70) than under average productivity increases (r0). Similar patterns
occur for consumption of formal goods, GDP per capita and pension per beneficiary, in different
magnitudes. These differences takes place in spite of a larger decline in effective labor supply
when growth is larger (average of 629 yearly hours per capita instead of 667) and illustrate the
effect of larger productivity growth.
6.3 Effects of additional reforms
This section reports the long run results of additional reform measures as described in the last
part of table 1. Tables 5 and 6 contain results for all additional reforms except large retirement
age increases, which are contained in tables 7 and 8.
We start by discussing the results in tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: Overview of selected additional reform simulation results for Slovakia
r0
r6
03
r5
2
r5
3
r1
92
r1
92
2
r2
04
20
10
A
gi
ng
C
ap
T
ax
+
W
P
en
A
cc
-
P
en
A
cc
-
+
2
ye
ar
s
+
2
ye
ar
s,
H
C
0
+
4
ye
ar
s,
H
C
0
ab
so
lu
te
nu
m
be
rs
P
op
ul
at
io
n
(1
5+
,
no
rm
al
iz
ed
)
10
0.
00
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
D
ep
en
de
nc
y
ra
ti
o
19
.1
7
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
P
en
si
on
er
s
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
24
.8
7
40
.3
1
40
.2
9
40
.3
1
40
.3
4
37
.7
1
37
.6
2
35
.0
4
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ag
e
58
.0
2
58
.2
2
58
.2
3
58
.2
2
58
.2
0
60
.1
9
60
.2
6
62
.2
2
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
14
.7
4
14
.4
1
14
.3
7
14
.5
2
14
.5
7
14
.2
2
13
.8
3
13
.7
8
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
rl
y
ho
ur
s
pe
r
fo
rm
al
w
or
ke
r)
17
86
17
85
17
86
17
83
17
83
17
81
17
81
17
84
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
fo
rm
al
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
r
ho
ur
s/
ca
pi
ta
)
79
3
66
7
67
4
65
7
65
3
69
9
71
7
74
2
L
ow
-s
ki
lls
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
9.
06
9.
68
9.
78
9.
70
9.
70
9.
67
9.
06
9.
06
M
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
ll
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
75
.1
8
77
.2
3
77
.4
1
77
.2
9
77
.3
2
77
.1
4
75
.1
8
75
.1
8
H
ig
h-
sk
ill
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
15
.7
6
13
.0
9
12
.8
0
13
.0
1
12
.9
8
13
.1
9
15
.7
6
15
.7
6
In
fo
rm
al
it
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
)
12
.7
4
9.
32
8.
59
10
.3
0
10
.6
7
9.
72
8.
05
9.
45
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(l
ow
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-3
.4
9
-4
.0
8
-3
.2
9
-3
.2
9
-5
.3
5
-2
.2
6
-3
.2
6
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-3
.0
3
-3
.4
9
-2
.8
5
-2
.8
3
-2
.8
1
0.
12
-0
.0
7
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(h
ig
h-
sk
ill
ed
)
-
13
.8
1
15
.7
3
13
.9
4
14
.0
8
15
.1
0
2.
98
2.
40
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
pe
r
be
ne
fic
ia
ry
-
-1
.4
1
-0
.4
1
-1
6.
54
-2
1.
25
3.
11
6.
35
8.
37
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(l
ow
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-4
.3
7
-4
.2
4
-1
8.
90
-2
3.
40
1.
85
9.
91
-
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-1
.1
7
-0
.5
0
-1
6.
48
-2
2.
04
4.
10
12
.6
0
-
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(h
ig
h-
sk
ill
ed
)
-
34
.4
7
40
.7
7
16
.0
7
7.
34
34
.3
9
6.
15
-
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-1
4.
52
-1
4.
35
-1
5.
74
-1
6.
25
-1
0.
49
-7
.3
0
-4
.8
6
In
fo
rm
al
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-4
2.
97
-4
7.
61
-3
7.
46
-3
5.
42
-3
7.
92
-4
3.
63
-3
1.
76
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
go
od
s)
-
5.
36
-3
.0
6
2.
52
1.
52
7.
54
9.
96
8.
57
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
&
in
fo
rm
al
go
od
s)
-
0.
02
-7
.9
8
-1
.8
9
-2
.5
6
2.
52
4.
05
4.
12
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
co
ns
um
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
-
-5
6.
12
-2
9.
12
-4
4.
64
-4
1.
41
-4
5.
74
-4
2.
40
-3
4.
41
A
ss
et
s/
ca
pi
ta
-
33
.9
3
22
.8
1
36
.2
6
36
.7
5
34
.0
2
35
.4
2
26
.4
5
in
%
of
ba
si
s
G
D
P
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
7.
10
9.
19
9.
28
7.
78
7.
34
8.
99
9.
25
8.
78
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
7.
10
11
.3
4
11
.4
5
9.
60
9.
07
11
.1
0
11
.4
2
10
.8
4
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
0.
08
5.
08
5.
08
3.
78
3.
39
4.
45
4.
45
3.
68
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
0.
08
6.
27
6.
27
4.
67
4.
19
5.
50
5.
49
4.
54
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
0.
04
4.
40
4.
44
3.
05
2.
64
3.
95
4.
07
3.
42
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
po
p)
0.
04
5.
43
5.
48
3.
76
3.
26
4.
88
5.
02
4.
22
N
ot
es
:
A
ll
+
4
ye
ar
s
(r
20
4)
re
fo
rm
s
ar
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
w
it
h
co
ns
ta
nt
hu
m
an
ca
pi
ta
l
fo
r
te
ch
ni
ca
l
re
as
on
s.
27
Table 6: Overview of selected additional reform simulation results for Poland
r0
r6
03
r5
2
r5
3
r1
92
r1
92
2
r2
04
20
10
A
gi
ng
C
ap
T
ax
+
W
P
en
A
cc
-
P
en
A
cc
-
+
2
ye
ar
s
+
2
ye
ar
s,
H
C
0
+
4
ye
ar
s,
H
C
0
ab
so
lu
te
nu
m
be
rs
P
op
ul
at
io
n
(1
5+
,
no
rm
al
iz
ed
)
10
0.
00
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
D
ep
en
de
nc
y
ra
ti
o
22
.6
6
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
P
en
si
on
er
s
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
26
.0
2
39
.0
3
39
.0
5
39
.0
3
39
.0
4
36
.3
8
36
.3
0
33
.7
7
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ag
e
59
.3
7
59
.3
3
59
.3
2
59
.3
4
59
.3
3
61
.3
5
61
.4
1
63
.3
3
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
13
.3
6
13
.2
0
13
.2
1
13
.3
1
13
.3
4
12
.9
7
12
.5
4
12
.3
7
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
rl
y
ho
ur
s
pe
r
fo
rm
al
w
or
ke
r)
19
39
19
36
19
35
19
33
19
32
19
26
19
27
19
26
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
fo
rm
al
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
r
ho
ur
s/
ca
pi
ta
)
60
4
50
6
50
7
49
8
49
6
52
7
55
3
57
6
L
ow
-s
ki
lls
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
12
.0
3
12
.2
4
12
.2
9
12
.2
5
12
.2
5
12
.2
6
12
.0
3
12
.0
3
M
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
ll
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
66
.8
2
69
.3
4
69
.8
6
69
.4
7
69
.5
0
69
.2
6
66
.8
2
66
.8
2
H
ig
h-
sk
ill
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
21
.1
5
18
.4
2
17
.8
5
18
.2
9
18
.2
5
18
.4
9
21
.1
5
21
.1
5
In
fo
rm
al
it
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
)
33
.1
8
32
.6
8
32
.5
8
33
.4
7
33
.6
9
33
.6
1
30
.8
0
31
.6
6
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(l
ow
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-1
.7
3
-2
.6
1
-1
.1
8
-1
.1
5
-1
.7
9
0.
28
0.
74
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-2
.6
6
-3
.8
0
-2
.3
5
-2
.3
5
-2
.0
9
1.
88
2.
53
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(h
ig
h-
sk
ill
ed
)
-
8.
81
10
.6
6
8.
99
9.
09
10
.2
7
4.
37
3.
84
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
pe
r
be
ne
fic
ia
ry
-
-5
.7
0
-5
.9
5
-1
6.
88
-1
9.
94
-2
.4
6
1.
97
5.
38
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(l
ow
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-2
.6
5
-2
.7
9
-1
4.
47
-1
7.
27
-2
.3
1
1.
47
-
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-5
.0
2
-5
.8
2
-1
5.
86
-1
8.
83
-4
.0
0
3.
46
-
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
(h
ig
h-
sk
ill
ed
)
-
11
.0
6
14
.5
4
-0
.7
9
-5
.7
3
10
.8
1
2.
05
-
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-1
4.
55
-1
5.
21
-1
5.
71
-1
6.
10
-1
0.
75
-5
.2
6
-0
.2
9
In
fo
rm
al
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-2
0.
76
-2
1.
73
-1
9.
22
-1
8.
73
-1
4.
00
-1
6.
89
-9
.5
0
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
go
od
s)
-
-1
.3
1
-7
.9
5
-4
.1
2
-4
.9
8
0.
41
4.
81
15
.1
2
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
&
in
fo
rm
al
go
od
s)
-
-7
.2
6
-1
2.
16
-8
.7
3
-9
.1
9
-4
.0
0
-1
.8
3
7.
60
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
co
ns
um
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
-
-6
5.
87
-4
7.
70
-5
3.
26
-5
0.
06
-5
3.
09
-4
6.
51
-1
9.
48
A
ss
et
s/
ca
pi
ta
-
9.
04
-2
.2
2
13
.4
4
14
.2
5
9.
10
10
.2
0
59
.2
6
in
%
of
ba
si
s
G
D
P
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
13
.1
6
13
.9
6
13
.9
3
12
.3
0
11
.8
5
13
.4
6
14
.0
4
13
.5
0
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
13
.1
6
18
.6
1
18
.5
7
16
.4
1
15
.8
0
17
.9
4
18
.7
2
18
.0
0
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
8.
04
11
.2
5
11
.2
2
9.
67
9.
24
10
.4
6
10
.6
6
9.
82
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
8.
04
15
.0
0
14
.9
7
12
.8
9
12
.3
2
13
.9
5
14
.2
1
13
.1
0
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
5.
90
9.
37
9.
34
7.
77
7.
34
8.
65
8.
95
8.
18
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
po
p)
5.
90
12
.4
9
12
.4
6
10
.3
6
9.
78
11
.5
3
11
.9
3
10
.9
0
N
ot
es
:
A
ll
+
4
ye
ar
s
(r
20
4)
re
fo
rm
s
ar
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
w
it
h
co
ns
ta
nt
hu
m
an
ca
pi
ta
l
fo
r
te
ch
ni
ca
l
re
as
on
s.
The previous sections demonstrated how aging affects the savings decision of the individual
households. The question arises how well capital income taxation (r603) performs in raising rev-
enue to reduce the increasing fiscal gap compared to other reforms, such as raising social security
contributions (r34). The direct effect is that asset accumulation is hampered and significantly
28
reduced compared to the pure aging benchmark (r0) in the long run. This reduces capital income
and therefore long run consumption. While the effect on formal labor market decision margins
is negligible there is an effect on the average informality rate. The informality rate in Slovakia is
reduced while it is almost constant in Poland. This can be explained by a skill composition effect
that arises in the long run. In relative terms the high skill suffer most from an increase in the
capital income tax which leads to decline in the share of high skills. The average informality rate
declines as high skill workers are characterized by the highest informality rates in Slovakia. As
a consequence there is a shift in average from informal to formal production. The effects on the
reported pension and social security deficits are negligible. This should not come as a surprise
as revenue from capital income taxation affects these deficits only indirectly via changes in the
social security contribution tax base. The generated revenue flows into the general budget (which
is ultimately used to cover the deficit in the social security system). Comparing the endogenous
changes in government consumption per capita which is used to close the general budget reveals
that generated revenue is sizable, e.g. government consumption per capita has to decrease by
47.7% instead of 65.9% for Poland and by 29.1% instead of 56.1% for Slovakia.
Reducing the rate of accrual of pensions rights (columns r52, r53) has similar effects as a cut
in the earnings-related part of pension benefits (column r29, tables 3 and 4). Subsection 6.2
elaborates on these effects. This is not a surprise, as these reforms are very close in nature: the
first kind cuts the rate at which past pension rights accumulate in the future and the second kind
cuts the conversion factor between pension rights and actual monetary payments, once retired.
Magnitudes however differ, as r52 and r53 reforms are milder. Since reform r52 only reduces the
accrual rate while households are in age of working, r52 impacts are smaller than r53 impacts.
The effective retirement age as well as the statutory retirement age (reference for financial in-
centives) were further raised by 4 years (column r204). For technical reasons, the simulation
assumes constant human capital decisions. As the comparisons of the effect of a 2 years increase
of the retirement age with variable and constant human capital decisions show (column r192
and r1922), impacts on the social security deficit are correctly predicted when human capital
decisions are kept constant. The aging related increase in the social security deficit can be cut
by about 50% for Poland and 30% for Slovakia. Hence, an increase of the effective retirement
age by 4 years, which relates to approximately 40% of the increase in life expectancy during the
same time period22, is not sufficient to contain the social security and general budget deficit for
given tax and contribution rates, but effective. Further increases in the retirement age would be
necessary to restore the financial sustainability of the pension system, which we discuss next.
Tables 7 and 8 contain the results of further increases in the retirement age, alone or coupled
with other reforms.
22United Nations (2011) predicts an increase in life expectancy at birth from 75.8 in 2010 to 85.3 in 2100 for
Slovakia and from 76.4 to 85.6 for Poland.
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Table 7: Overview of selected reforms with large retirement age increase for Slovakia
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Table 8: Overview of selected reforms with large retirement age increase for Poland
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Results in the two tables are obtained with a model where there is no distinction between formal
and informal work, for technical and resource commitments reasons23. With the exception of av-
23The complete CGE model with formal and informal work was not originally implemented to handle large
31
erage pension payments per beneficiary, the simulation of aging (columns r0) and 2 years increase
in retirement age (columns r192, with variable and constant informality decisions, r192+r57) by
the models with and without informality are reasonably comparable24. One can then use the
model without informality as an estimate of the effect of large retirement increases, comparing
changes with the no reform case r0 (rather than absolute values). Effects of an increase of 8
years of retirement (column r199) are identical to the effects of a 2 years increase (column r192),
except that they are more pronounced, as expected. Subsection 6.2 explains the driving forces.
The social security deficit is cut in half in Slovakia (from above 6% of GDP to 3% of GDP) and
it is cut in three in Poland (from above 7.5% of GDP to less than 2.5% of GDP). The deficit re-
duction is larger in Poland because the accrual rate of pension rights is lower (0.2% when retired,
as opposed to 0.5% in Slovakia) and because the demographic challenge is not as strong (the
dependency ratio increases more between 2010 and 2100 in Slovakia). Output per capita and
average pensions per beneficiary all increase at the same speed or faster than the productivity
growth trend, sometimes markedly.
During the period considered, the projected increase in life expectancy is about 9 years. In spite
of an increase of retirement of 8 years, the deficit is not entirely eliminated. This may come as a
surprise. The explanation is that the population aging phenomenon cannot be represented only
by an increase in life expectancy. It also means that the fraction of old age persons increases,
in particular for countries such as Slovakia and Poland. The fraction of pensioners in Slovakia,
even with an increase of 8 years of the retirement age, moves from 25% to 30% of the population.
The role played by pension indexation in the differences in outcomes between Slovakia and Poland
suggests that the deficit could be further cut with only a mild decrease in the accrual rate. When
the accrual rate is cut by 25%, the deficit drops from 3% to 2.1% of GDP in Slovakia (column
r1500), without any significant damage to the average pension payment per beneficiary. We will
discuss other combined reforms in more details in the next section.
6.4 Effects of combined reforms
Results of the reforms described in table 2 are collected in tables 9 and 10 (except reform r1500,
contained in tables 7 and 8).
policy reform shocks, such as large increase in retirement age. With appropriate resources, it is possible to
improve on the original implementation so that the model handles large policy shocks.
24Naturally, the effective employment per capita figures are very different, since they only report formal hours
of work in the model with a distinction between formal and informal work. The figures should not be compared,
but the variations can be compared.
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Table 9: Overview of long run simulation results of combined reforms for Slovakia
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Table 10: Overview of long run simulation results of combined reforms for Poland
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Increases in the flat part of pension benefits may help to achieve the political goal of fighting
poverty in old age. As seen in table 16 (column 327), informality increases. There can thus be
a short term drawback in the implementation of such a policy, as social contribution resources
decrease. One could thus try to curb the increase in informality with a decrease in welfare
benefits (see column r101 of table 3). As shown in column r1002 of table 9, the combined reform
indeed succeeds in keeping a low informality rate (as r101) while at the same time increasing the
average pension payment per beneficiary (as r327). The table also shows that, in the long run,
public finances will only slightly improve (while the social security deficit is essentially constant,
the decrease in government consumption per capita needed to balance the budget drops to 92%,
instead of 96% for reform r327). This outcome is not a surprise as the decrease in informality
adds contributions but increases pension expenditures.
In the long run, a combined reform with the same political goal which is more effective in long
run public finance would be to increase the flat part of pension benefits with an increase in
consumption taxes (column r1011 in table 9): the average pension payment is almost as high as
reform r327 but the government consumption per capita only has to drop to 80% to close the
budget.
Another interesting policy mix would be an increase in the retirement age with a decrease in
welfare benefits (column r1101 in table 9): the average pension payment increases 8% (while
it only increased 3% with sole increase in retirement age), due to the decrease in informality
(inherited from the decrease in welfare benefits), and the government consumption per capita
decreases less (42% instead of 46% with sole increase in retirement age). What appears to be
crucial for the definition of the policy mix are the goals of the reforms, on top of containing
public finance costs.
If the focus is on stimulating formal sector work alone, equal decreases in the earnings-related
part of pension benefits and in labor income taxes is of interest (column r1021). The simulation
confirms the expectation, as formal work hours per capita are 681 (compared to 667 with no
reform, column r0). Financing of social security improves even more than sole cuts in earnings-
related pension benefits (reform r29 in tables 3 and 4), thanks to the combined cut in benefits
and decrease in informality.
For further contribution to social security deficit reduction, adding increases in retirement age
is interesting (column r1221). One achieves the best outcome overall in deficit reduction, going
down from 5% of GDP to 0.5% of GDP, thanks to the largest amount of formal work, at 717
hours per capita. Associated are small losses in output per capita and a low informality rate.
Other policies are however more successful at fighting old age poverty, as the average loss in
pension payments per beneficiary is close to 40% (relative to the productivity growth trend).
Fiscal devaluations - a shift from labor income taxation to consumption taxation - is often
considered an interesting policy reform to stimulate job and output growth, at least over the
short run. Simulations (column r1301) show however that the policy may not be attractive over
the long run: most of its outcomes are worse than the sole reduction in labor income taxes
(column r86 in tables 16 and 17). For instance, the loss of output per capita is larger than
11% (relative to trend) with reform r1301, compared to a loss of less than 6% with reform r86.
The reason is that larger consumption taxes increase informality (see discussion of reform r91 in
subsection 6.2).
We finish with a discussion of reform r1400 for Poland, which combines an increase in retirement
age, cuts in earnings-related pension benefits and a decrease in capital income taxation, to
35
encourage private savings25. As expected, private savings increases, as asset per capita grew
16% more than the productivity growth trend (compared to 9% when there is no reform, column
r0). Compared to the sole increase in retirement age (column r192 in table 4), the reforms allow
for a larger social security deficit reduction, to 9.8% of GDP instead of 10.5%. There is however
a larger loss in output per capita, to 13.6% instead of 10.8% (relative to trend), and bigger drop
in average pension per beneficiary, to 12% instead of 2.5%. One reason for these differences in
outcome is that informality is larger, to 33.9% instead of 33.6%. Cuts in earnings-related pension
benefits indeed discourage work in the formal sector.
6.5 Short-run analysis
This section’s analysis considers the transition path from one equilibrium to the other given the
aging shock (r0) for Slovakia. The change in mortality rates and the number of new entrants was
gradually phased-in to replicate the change in the demographic structure over time as closely as
possible. Table 11 illustrates the adjustment path. Given the projections from United Nations
(2011) the population slightly increases after 2010 before steadily falling to about 80% of its
2010 value. The age-structure is also characterized by a non-monotonic trend, which can be seen
when looking at the dependency ratio which rises up to more than 52% in the second half of
this century before decreasing again and settling at a level of about 46%. A direct effect of the
increase in life-expectancy is that households reduce consumption and start to save because they
have to supplement their pensions for a longer period of time. Assets slowly build up, allowing
households to enjoy consumption in the long run at the same level as in 2010. The non-monotonic
behavior of the dependency ratio is also reflected in some of the labor supply outcomes, such
as yearly hours per capita which are lowest in 2070 before slightly recovering again. The same
is consequently true for the social security macro measures. Around 2070 pension expenditure
and the social security deficit increase to a peak of 11.9 and 7.5%, respectively, before falling
again. Another observation is that gross wages for the high-skilled workers are lower than in
2010 up to the mid of the 2020s before rising considerably afterward. The rise is explained by
shifts in the endogenous skill-structure and relative scarcity of high-skilled workers. This also
explains why the increase in the wage rate does not occur before the mid 2020s because workers
altered education choices require time before affecting the labor market. The positive relation
between the life expectancy and the informality rate was established in the previous section.
Interestingly, the informality rate decreases in a U-shaped way over time while life expectancy
increases monotonically. The slight increase in the informality rate in the second half of the
century is explained by a relative drop in wage.
25The reform was only performed for Poland because capital income taxes are too low in Slovakia and can not
be cut enough to have interesting simulation results.
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Table 11: Results of the aging scenario over time for Slovakia
2010 2020 2050 2070 Final SS
absolute numbers
Population (15+, normalized) 100.00 101.19 95.55 91.27 81.00
Dependency ratio 19.17 26.23 46.67 52.38 45.69
Pensioners (in % of population) 24.87 29.88 41.68 43.84 40.31
Effective retirement age 58.02 58.18 58.28 58.25 58.22
Unemployment rate 14.74 14.24 13.81 14.05 14.41
Employment (yearly hours per formal worker) 1786 1784 1787 1786 1785
Effective formal employment (year hours/capita) 793 797 689 650 667
Low-skills population (in % of population) 9.06 9.13 9.34 9.47 9.68
Medium-skill population (in % of population) 75.18 75.73 76.78 77.13 77.23
High-skill population (in % of population) 15.76 15.14 13.88 13.40 13.08
Informality rate (in % of participants) 12.74 10.50 7.12 7.56 9.32
increase from basis in %
Labor costs (low-skilled) - -3.58 -0.53 -1.57 -3.49
Labor costs (medium-skilled) - -3.20 -0.23 -1.06 -3.03
Labor costs (high-skilled) - -4.51 14.64 16.85 13.81
Pension payment per beneficiary - -2.23 1.39 6.50 -1.41
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -1.03 -10.42 -15.08 -14.52
Informal GDP/capita - -17.73 -54.29 -55.07 -42.97
Consumption/capita (formal goods) - -8.82 5.43 8.26 5.36
Consumption/capita (formal & informal goods) - -9.81 -1.16 1.27 0.02
Government consumption/capita - -10.41 -46.13 -64.63 -56.12
Assets/capita - 5.08 23.47 28.92 33.96
in % of basis GDP
Pension expenditure 7.10 8.44 11.53 12.16 9.19
Pension expenditure (constant population) 7.10 8.34 12.06 13.32 11.34
Social security deficit 0.08 1.52 6.08 7.55 5.08
Social security deficit (constant population) 0.08 1.50 6.36 8.27 6.27
Pension social security deficit 0.04 1.40 5.54 6.78 4.40
Pension social security deficit (const pop) 0.04 1.39 5.80 7.43 5.43
Note: Final SS refers to the final steady state which approximately corresponds to the year 2100.
One conclusion from the long run analysis was that the level of informality is not a crucial driver
of the social security deficit in the long run. In the short run, however, the effect is different.
This conclusion is drawn from comparing the path of the social security deficit when informality
declines spontaneously with age (r0) with the path of the social security deficit when informality
is kept constant (r57). The difference in these paths is illustrated in figure 3. With endogenous
informality the social security deficit is up to 0.5 %-points lower than if informality rates were
constant. This has a simple explanation. The reduction in informality is beneficial for the social
security system at first as formal employment and therefore social security contribution payments
increase. In the long run however this effect is canceled as pension expenditure rises because of
the strong earnings-to-pension link.
Table 21 in appendix C in addition presents the path for one example of reform, namely the
permanent increase in social security contributions (r34) in 2011. The path of the social security
deficit is shifted downward compared to table 11 where only aging is considered. This leads to
a social security surplus in the first years after the reform but is not sufficient to contain the
deficit in the long run.
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Figure 3: Difference in social security deficit as % of 2010 GDP in percentage points between
the aging scenario with endogenous informality (r0) and with constant informality (r57)
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
2011 2021 2031 2041 2051 2061
Note: A negative value means that the social security deficit is higher in the aging scenario where informality
rates are constant.
6.6 Sensitivity analysis
This section presents the results of various sensitivity tests. We check the sensitivity of the
previous results, denoted as basis calibration (s0), along six dimensions. We raise the behavioral
responsiveness parameters for the informality, hours and participation margin. We consider a
uniform increase in the informal income for all age-skill-groups. Next, we check the robustness of
the results to making the informal income profile steeper along the skill-dimension, i.e. the dif-
ference between high- and medium-skilled informal income in comparison to low-skilled informal
earnings is increased by 50%. The last sensitivity check concerns the profile of the informality
rates. Given the limited data quality concerning age- and skill-group specific informality rates,
we chose a sensitivity scenario where informality rates are completely identical for all households
to check the qualitative and quantitative importance of the chosen profiles in the benchmark
calibration. Table 12 summarizes the different sensitivity scenarios. For all of them26 we simu-
lated the pure aging case (Aging, r0) and an increase in the social security contributions (SSC+,
r34) for both Poland and Slovakia. Tables 22 to 25 in appendix D report all the results. In the
presentation of the sensitivity results we will focus on the pure aging scenario (r0).
The increase in the responsiveness at the informality margin (s1) amplifies the drop in informality
due to aging from 12.7 to 7.5 instead of 9.5 for Slovakia and from 33.2 to 32.0 instead of 32.7 for
Poland. As expected, the larger shift from informal to formal sector also impacts variations in
GDP per capita. However, the long run effects on social security deficits are hardly changed. This
supports the results from the previous section that changes in informality have only temporary
effects on the net fiscal outcomes for the government as both revenues and expenditure change in
size over the long run. For example in Slovakia long run pension expenditure increases from 9.15
% to 9.41 % of GDP compared to the benchmark calibration, while the social security deficit
only changes from 5.07 to 5.11 % of GDP.
The increase in the elasticity of the hours and participation decision (s3 and s5) by 25% has only
tiny effects. In addition the results also seem to be robust to changes in the level of informal
income (s7). The model was recalibrated using a 5% uniform increase in the informal incomes
which led to virtually unchanged pension and social security deficits.
As another sensitivity check we changed the informal income profiles along the skill class dimen-
26We also ran simulations with the opposite sensitivity changes to s1, s3, s5, s7 and s9. As the results were
completely symmetric they are not reported in this report but available upon request.
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sion (s9). The motivation is that country specific differences in income profiles, in general, explain
the fact that variations in informality rates are higher in Slovakia than in Poland. We increased
the difference of the high- and medium skilled informal incomes in comparison to the low-skilled
by 50%. Simulations for both countries show that the model with this altered calibration delivers
very similar results, in particular for the pension and social security deficits.
The last sensitivity check concern the profiles of the informality rates (s14) which were derived
from Koettl and Weber (2012) (see appendix section A.1). This resulted in an informality rate
profile that is decreasing in skill in Poland and increasing in skill in Slovakia. In the sensitivity
analysis we eliminated these patterns by assigning the average informality rate to every skill
and age group. As documented in tables 22 to 25 of appendix D, this does not affect the
results qualitatively. The quantitative differences appear small, in comparison to the benchmark
calibration.
The general conclusion of the sensitivity analysis is that the simulations with the benchmark
calibration value are robust.
Table 12: Additional sensitivity simulations
Sensitivity parameter Change Sensitivity code Comment
none - s0 basis basis calibration
Elasticity of informality +50% s1 elast inf+ higher elasticity
Elasticity of hours decisions +25% s3 elast hour+ higher elasticity
Elasticity of participation +25% s5 elast part+ higher elasticity
Informal income level +5% s7 yinf+ uniform proportional increase
Informal income profile +50% s9 yinf steep steeper profile
Equalized informality rate 100% s14 equal inf rate full equalization
6.7 Summary of findings
The eight main findings of the general equilibrium analysis of aging and reforms in Poland and
Slovakia, taking informality, retirement and other households decisions into account, are the
following: (i) the analysis confirms the challenge posed by population aging on the financing of
social security, deficits growing by more than 5 percentage points of GDP in constant population
terms until 2100; (ii) population aging alone, without any reforms, reduces the rate of informality
by as much as 30%; (iii) reforms usually have the anticipated effects on deficits and informality
in qualitative terms, with the exception of welfare benefit cuts, which do not reduce deficits;
(iv) informality alone is not a cause for social security deficit in the long run; (v) however,
in the short run a reduction in informality decreases social security deficits; (vi) reductions in
pension benefits are the most efficient reforms to cut the social security deficit due to aging; (vii)
variations in informality rates differ significantly between Poland and Slovakia; (viii) the results
are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to calibration changes.
It is useful to remember that the macroeconomic set-up is not suitable for poverty and income
inequality analysis, that we assumed constant per capita and per age-group health expenditures
and that simulations relied on a technical choice for closing the government budget which isolates
the effect of aging and reform but is not realistic and underestimates the public finance cost of
aging.
The analysis delivers other interesting findings. We discuss and provide explanations together
for the eight main and the other findings.
(i) The challenge of financing social security with population aging is standard. Most of the
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increase in deficit is due to pension expenditures, which increase by 3% of initial GDP in Poland
and by 5% in Slovakia until 2100. The reason is standard: as the likelihood of surviving past
the retirement age increases, the number of contributors increases slower (even shrinks) than the
number of beneficiaries.
(ii) A novel finding is that aging alone reduces the informality rate, sometimes by more than
30%. One reason is simply the increase in life expectancy, which makes the financing of post-
retirement life more important. Earnings-related parts of pension benefits increase with more
formal sector work, explaining the decline in informality. Another reason is related to human
capital acquisition and the aging process. As the probability of dying young decreases, continuous
training to increase productivity, wages and later earnings-related pension benefits becomes more
interesting.
(iii) As expected, postponing retirement age or increasing contributions reduce the social security
deficit. Higher exogenous productivity growth also reduces the deficit, but the associated increase
in informality and decline in contributions wipe away most of the gains. The fact that welfare
benefits cuts deliver no improvement in social security deficits may be unexpected. The reason
is that the associated decline in informality has immediate positive consequences on the deficit,
as more contributions are collected, but later negative consequences, as the earnings-related part
of pension benefits increases, leading to higher pension expenditures.
Reforms usually have the expected effect on informality rates. Increasing contributions and tax
rates, reducing the earnings-related part of pension benefits, increasing welfare benefits and the
flat part of pensions all increase informality, because these reforms decrease the value of formal
sector relative to informal sector work. The increase in informality caused by higher productivity
growth may come as a surprise, if one is not aware of the fact that pension benefits are not fully
indexed to wage and thus productivity growth.
(iv) Another potentially surprising finding is the fact that informality alone is not a cause for
the growing social security deficit in the long run. An experiment where informality decisions
are exogenous and constant shows that the social security deficit is identical, if not lower. The
reduction of informality due to aging does not lead to a lower deficit. This finding is confirmed
in the sensitivity analysis when higher elasticities at the informality margin are considered. This
increases the reactions on the informality rate but has negligible consequences for long run social
security deficits. The reason is the same as for welfare benefit cuts: immediate financing gains
of lower informality are overturned by later higher expenditures, an immediate consequence of
the strong earnings-related characteristics of the pension systems in both countries. In general
and for the same reason, the reduction of informality due to any reform does not contribute to a
reduction of the social security deficit. The reform may have other effects which overall reduce
the deficit, but this is not due to informality. An early policy implication of the analysis is that a
reduction of informality alone is not an appropriate measure if the sole target is the reduction of
social security deficit. There may be however other reasons to target a reduction in informality.
Simulations also show that if one adds other targets to reforms, such as a reduction in poverty
by means of an increase in welfare benefits, then the deficit may increase in part because of an
increase in informality. Informal decisions thus remain an important channel for welfare and
public finance analysis.
(v) While changes in the informality rate have hardly any effect on long run social security
deficits, they do affect them in the short run. The simple explanation is that a change in the
informality rate has an immediate impact on revenues but a lagged effect on expenditures which
only occurs when people retire.
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(vi) From the limited simulations considered, a decrease in pension benefits is the only really
successful reform to eliminate the deficit. An increase in retirement age by 4 years which is about
40% of the respective increase in life expectancy can almost eliminate the aging-related drop in
GDP per capita but would reduce the rise in the social security deficit by only 50% for Poland
and 30% for Slovakia.
(vii) There is a significant difference in the quantitative effect of aging on informality between
both countries. Informality decreases by more than 30% in Slovakia and by less than 5% in
Poland. The main reason for different outcomes in Poland and Slovakia are formal earnings
profiles and skill choices. Aging generates more training for high skills than others, because they
experience lower disutility costs from training. The formal labor supply shock initially reduces
wages of high skills, changing education decisions in favor of medium skills, which later increases
high skill wages again, in general equilibrium. This attracts workers away from the informal
sector. High skilled workers in Poland earn more, relative to low skill workers. There is thus less
of a reason to shift from high to medium skills, a lower variation in wages and thus a lower shift
from the informal to the formal sector.
(viii) There are also large differences in the observed levels in informality rates between countries,
illustrating the challenge of obtaining quality data and the difficulty in identifying informality.
However, sensitivity analyses showed that differences in the choice of the informality parameters
for the CGE model have little influence on the qualitative and quantitative results. The quan-
titative robustness in particular holds for simulation of the social security deficit over the long
run, a direct consequence of finding (iv).
7 Policy implications
We present policy implications on the long run with a unique or multiple goals as well as impli-
cations for short run goals.
7.1 Long run single goal of financial sustainability
Over the long run, if one considers the reduction of the public finance deficit alone, making the
difference between informal and formal sector or not leads to the same policy implications. In
other words, informality does not play a role. Policy implications are standard. These are as
follows.
Reforms are needed to secure the financial sustainability of the pension system as population
ages. The challenge is not small. In Slovakia, the social security system starts from a balanced
position in 2010 and ends up with a deficit of 5% of GDP by 2100. In Poland, the system starts
with a deficit position of 8% of GDP in 2010 and reaches 11% by 2100.
Parametric pension reforms have the standard effects: increases in the retirement age, decreases
in pension benefits or increases in social security contributions all improve the financing of the
pension system. Each have their advantages and disadvantages.
Both in Poland and Slovakia, decreases in pension benefits are the most successful at improving
the financing of the system. However, cuts in benefits may increase poverty risk to unacceptable
levels.
Mild increases in the retirement age improve the financing of the pension system to a smaller
degree but is more successful at maintaining the output level. When the increase in retirement
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age is sufficiently large, financing of the pension system can be secured. How society balance its
priorities between leisure and consumption also plays a role.
Increases in social security contributions help to the lower extent and have negative impacts on
labor supply, output and consumption. By international standards, Poland and Slovakia have
already large tax and contribution rates so this result is not surprising.
The intuition behind these policy implications are standard, with one exception. The exception
concerns informality, which does not play a role over the long run when the sole objective
is financial sustainability. A decline in informality helps over the short run as contributions
increase, but over the long run, increases in pension expenditures neutralize this benefit.
7.2 Long run multiple goals
If financial sustainability is not the only goal then informality can play a role for long run policy
design. For instance, if fairness is a consideration, governments may want to both decrease
informality and ensure the financial sustainability of the pension system.
With this dual goal of informality decline and financing improvement, the standard policy im-
plications which arise from analysis where there is no distinction between formal and informal
sectors are modified. The main difference takes place for pension benefit reductions. Cutting
the flat part is efficient while cutting the earnings-related part becomes counterproductive, as
informality increases.
Increases in the retirement age reach the same pension financing improvements but have es-
sentially no strong positive nor negative impacts on informality27. Increases in social security
contributions become even less desirable, as it moves away from the informality reduction target:
the rate increases.
Under this dual goal, cutting the flat part of pension benefits is the most efficient single dimension
policy reform. It however increases the risk of poverty in old age.
If one consider the three goals of informality reduction, pension financing improvement and old
age poverty reduction, which may be realistic for Poland and Slovakia, large increases in retire-
ment age become the most desirable single dimension pension reform. This policy reform can
also be the preferred one if the goals are informality reduction, pension financing improvements
and high output per capita growth. Even though it has a limited impact on informality, it is
successful in improving the financial sustainability of the pension system while not increasing
the chance of old age poverty. It is at the same time the most effective of the policy considered
in keeping output per capita growth close to productivity growth. Large increases in retirement
age may however conflict with relative preferences on leisure and consumption.
Combination of single dimension reforms allow to balance targets.
For instance, combining light increases in retirement age, cuts in earnings-related pension benefits
and decreases in capital income taxes to encourage private savings, achieves generally compa-
rable outcomes as the sole increase in retirement but allows more improvements in financial
sustainability at the expense of worse protection against old age poverty.
The combination of light increases in retirement age, cuts in earnings-related pension benefits
and decreases in labor income taxes to encourage formal sector activity is appealing if financial
sustainability is even more important and protection against old age poverty even less important.
Fairness would also be improved.
27When the retirement age is increased 4 years, informality drops from 32.7% to 31.7% in Poland but increases
from 9.3% to 9.5% in Slovakia.
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Depending on the country institutions, combination of reforms may even be needed if one wants
to eliminate the social security deficit. For instance, if the accrual of pension rights is large, even
large increases in retirement age may leave some deficit. Small reduction in the accrual rate,
added to large increases in retirement age, deliver significant improvements: elimination of the
deficit, improvement in the fight against old age poverty and high output per capita growth28.
Which of the policy reform combination precisely is optimal depends on current institutions,
balance between the various goals of policy reforms and relative leisure and consumption prefer-
ences.
7.3 Adding short run single and multiple goals29
Informality has an impact on short run public finance positions and should thus be included in
the analysis of all policy options which involve sustainability of the pension system.
Simulations for Slovakia show that the spontaneous decrease in informality caused by aging
(making post-retirement income and thus formal sector earnings-related pension benefits more
attractive) increases contributions on the short run and can lead to an improvement in the social
security deficit reaching 0.5% of GDP after 20 years (and vanishing over the long run, when
pension expenditures catch up).
Assuming that the financial sustainability of the pension systems remains a primary objective
over the long run, the preferred policy reform scenario over shorter time horizons depends on the
trade-off between various objectives.
Social security contributions increases and cuts in the earnings-related part of pension benefits
both help to finance the pension systems in the long run but lead to an increase in the informality
rate, so appear undesirable.
Increases in the retirement age help the long run pension financing but have a small impact on
informality. Cuts in the flat part of pension benefits both improve pension financing and lead to
a decline in informality but increase the risk of old age poverty. Whether increases in retirement
age or cuts in the flat part of pension benefits are preferable thus depend on whether the primary
objective is low poverty in the old age (retirement age increase is preferable) or fairness (cuts in
the flat part of pensions is preferable).
We finish this section with caveat information. Due to its nature, data on informal activity is
difficult to collect. As a result, the calibration of the informal component of the CGE model is
less reliable than for other components. This uncertainty has however a low impact on policy
implications, for two reasons. First, sensitivity analysis showed that the simulation results where
robust. Second, we derived most policy implications from the qualitative outcomes of the simu-
lation results. We thus believe that policy implications are robust in their qualitative dimension.
We would urge more caution for interpretation of the quantitative part on informality in the
simulation results.
28Caveat: additional simulations would be needed to discuss the effect on fairness (low informality rate), but
we expect that fairness can not be degraded.
29Policy implications remain focused on the long run. This section adds short run considerations. Additional
simulations would be necessary to derive policy implications focused on the short run only.
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8 Conclusions
Like many other, countries in Europe and Central Asia face a mounting financial sustainability
challenge as population ages. At constant retirement age, rising life expectancy and decreases in
fertility lead to more retired households for a smaller working age population. Consistent with
other studies, our general equilibrium simulations predict that the social security deficit would
increase by more than 5% of GDP in Poland and Slovakia between 2010 and 2100 if no reforms
are undertaken.
The novelty of these results is that they take into account activity in the informal sector. Al-
though estimates vary, at 35% of GDP the average size of the shadow economy in Central Europe
and Central Asia is two to three times larger than the average in OECD countries. As partici-
pants in the informal labor market do not pay social security contributions and fewer taxes but
can rely on anti-poverty welfare benefits, high informality rates represent a significant challenge
for financing social security.
We introduce informality decisions into an otherwise standard but rich overlapping generations
model to investigate the effect of population aging and various reforms in two representative
countries, Poland and Slovakia. Households decide how much to save, whether to work or not,
how many hours to work or train, how hard to look for a job when unemployed and when to
retire. On top of this, if they decide to work, they choose between a formal or an informal sector.
By choosing the informal sector, they avoid social security contributions and labor income taxes
but only have access to anti-poverty welfare and pension benefits. In the formal sector, they
pay contribution and taxes but have access to higher benefits, related to their history of formal
sector earnings.
We find that aging alone reduces the informality rate in the long run, as the increase in the
post-retirement phase of life makes higher pensions, and thus work in the formal sector, more
attractive. We confirm that informality is a challenge in the short run but find that it plays no
role on the long run, if the sole objective of policy is financial sustainability. The spontaneous
decline in informality could lead to a reduction of 0.5% of GDP in the social security deficit in
Slovakia in the short run as contributions increase, compared to constant informality. In the long
run however, the increase in contributions is matched by an increase in expenditures, as pension
costs increase.
If the sole goal of pension reforms is the financing of the social security system, simulations show
that cuts in pension benefits are the most efficient over the long run. They may however increase
the risk of old-age poverty. If one consider the goals of informality reduction, pension financing
improvement, old age poverty reduction or steady increases in output per capita, increases in
retirement age may be the most balanced pension reform option.
Combination of reforms allow to balance multiple targets, to take into account current institutions
and relative preferences over leisure and consumption. Simulations show that large increases in
retirement with mild reductions in the accrual rates of pension rights would allow to wipe out the
deficit in Slovakia and Poland, while improving output per capita growth and protection against
old-age poverty. Light increases in retirement age, cuts in earnings-related pension benefits and
decreases in labor income taxes would also eliminate the deficit but at the expense of lower
protection against old-age poverty.
Additional investigations would be necessary for the analysis of policy reform options over the
short run. The general equilibrium model would have to be further expanded for an analysis of
pension reform options on mandatory private and other pillars.
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A Details on calibration
We present in details the calibration procedure and data requirement for the new component
of the full scale model, informality. We refer to documentation of the existing full scale model
for the remainder of the calibration approach and data sources, which has been performed for
Poland and Slovakia30. In this procedure, parameters are calibrated using micro-level data and
empirical studies and scaled such that aggregate expenditures in the model match empirical
targets. Although the model does not have a multi-pillar representation of the pension system,
the existing pay-as-you-go pillar and labor market related institutions are calibrated to capture
the main characteristics of multi-pillar systems. For example, no pension rights are earned during
unemployment and non-participation periods, in contrast to other European countries.
A.1 Informality rates
We are using informality rates by age and skill classes. As planned, we used table 3 of Koettl
and Weber (2012) for participation rates in the informal sector (given participation in any labor
market). We use allocation rules to establish a correspondence between the table age and income
classes in the paper and those of the model, which differ.
Taking the example of Poland, the correspondence for the age classes is given by:
Paper Allocation Model
Age class Rate (%) rule Age class Rate (%)
15-24 44.6 = 15-19 44.6
= 20-24 44.6
25-39 35.6 = 25-39 35.6
40-54 40.5 = 40-54 40.5
55-64 45.2 90% 55-69 48.0
65+ 73.7 10%
Skill levels and earnings are not perfectly correlated so we used the following correspondence:
Paper Allocation Model
Income group Rate (%) rule Skill level Rate (%)
25-49% of AW 40.4 = Low 40.4
100-200% of AW 29.3 = Medium 29.3
>200% of AW 25.7 = High 25.7
Assuming the same skill distribution of informality over each age class, taking into account the
model assumption that medium skills educate until 20 and high skills until 25, the resulting
informality rates by age and skill class used for calibration of the model are:
PL low medium high SK low medium high
15-19 50.6 0.0 0.0 15-19 8.9 0.0 0.0
20-24 50.6 36.7 0.0 20-24 8.9 8.2 0.0
25-39 40.4 29.3 25.7 25-39 11.8 10.9 21.6
40-54 46.0 33.3 29.2 40-54 12.7 11.8 23.3
55-69 54.5 39.5 34.7 55-69 13.8 12.8 25.3
30Detailed documentation of Berger et al. (2009), as used for a European Commission project, is for instance
available under http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4276&langId=en. The calibration approach for
Poland is presented in this document. Additional documentation is available upon request for Slovakia.
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The resulting average informality rate is 33.2% for Poland and 12.7% for Slovakia31.
A.2 Informal sector earning profiles
We rely on the EU-SILC database to calibrate the model with earnings profile in the informal
sector. Recall that the individual levels of earnings carry no meaning in the model neither in
the formal nor the informal sector, only the relationships matter. Our approach is therefore the
following: we calibrate the earnings profile and level in the informal sector such that differences
between informal workers are consistent with data, along age and skill dimensions, and such that
the premium for working in the formal sector as opposed to the informal sector is consistent with
data.
We identified informal workers in the data source based on Koettl and Weber (2012): employees
for whom there is no employer social security contribution; all family workers32; self-employed
with no employees who pays no social security contribution; self-employed with 1 to 5 employees
who pays no social security contribution. Given the lack of earnings information for Slovakia,
we relied on estimates for Poland33. For one skill and age class, the number of informal workers
was low and we imputed the corresponding earning value from similar classes. Imputation was
also performed for one outlier in the earnings profile for Slovakia.
The resulting earnings profiles in the informal sector are:
PL low medium high SK low medium high
15-19 1.00 0.00 0.00 15-19 1.00 0.00 0.00
20-24 1.17 1.33 0.00 20-24 1.05 1.27 0.00
25-39 1.81 1.71 3.05 25-39 1.10 1.35 1.84
40-54 1.48 2.06 4.52 40-54 1.06 1.40 2.23
55-69 1.49 1.93 3.79 55-69 1.05 1.28 1.76
For comparison purposes, the wage profiles in the formal sector are:
PL low medium high SK low medium high
15-19 1.00 0.00 0.00 15-19 1.00 0.00 0.00
20-24 1.17 1.37 0.00 20-24 1.05 1.32 0.00
25-39 1.46 1.81 3.28 25-39 1.12 1.44 1.98
40-54 1.63 2.22 4.38 40-54 1.14 1.51 2.15
55-69 1.55 2.22 4.63 55-69 1.10 1.48 2.15
Recall that these profile can only be compared in relative terms. Section A.3 provides information
on levels.
A.3 Informal sector earnings levels
Participation information on informality is not enough to characterize households behavior, we
also need to have productivity (or, equivalently, income) information. There are two options
31These numbers are different from the averages in Koettl and Weber (2012) and reduce the difference between
the two countries, in order to have a more comparable picture. Uniform changes in the levels of informality
are possible to match averages in Koettl and Weber (2012) but are unlikely to change the simulation results, as
profiles are more important than levels in driving behavior responses.
32Due to missing data, we used all family workers, not just unpaid family workers, as in Koettl and Weber
(2012). Given the small number of cases, we do not anticipate a big difference.
33We compared outcomes with the one transition country with sufficient data, Bulgaria, and confirmed that
they are similar.
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to have a measure of productivity in the informal sector. One is aggregate data, using shadow
economy measures. Another is household-level data, using earnings reports. The first option may
be more challenging, as one needs to remove the underreporting part from the shadow measure to
isolate informality activity. Yet, the lack of empirical literature on the size of tax underreporting
is notoriously problematic (for instance footnote 6, Schneider and Enste, 2000)34. We thus use
the second option.
Taking into account earnings profile (see section A.2) and productivity variations over the life-
cycle, we set the revenue in the informal sector such that the gross earning premium for working
in the formal sector relative to working in the informal sector is consistent with micro-level data.
The resulting earnings in the informal sector are then:
PL low medium high SK low medium high
15-19 0.71 0.00 0.00 15-19 0.61 0.00 0.00
20-24 0.70 0.94 0.00 20-24 0.60 0.78 0.00
25-39 0.86 0.91 2.16 25-39 0.59 0.77 1.12
40-54 0.63 0.90 2.41 40-54 0.57 0.76 1.29
55-69 0.70 0.86 1.92 55-69 0.58 0.70 0.97
Since these values only have a meaning when compared to earnings in the formal sector, we
compute the premium for working in the formal sector. The weighted average of the formal
sector premium are 1.157 for the model and 1.169 in the data for Poland; 1.169 in the model and
1.166 in the data for Slovakia35.
A.4 The response at the informality margin
The response at the informality margin is calibrated by setting the net disutility of formal work
ϕF (ζ) accordingly. The functional form chosen in the full model is similar to the disutility of
participation:
ϕF (ζ) = ϕ
1
F · vF ·
[
exp
(
ζ
vF
)
− exp
(
ζcalib
vF
)]
− ϕ2F · [ζ − ζcalib] .
Observe that in this specification disutility is normalized to zero in the initial steady state. Let
MBF denote the present value of the marginal benefit of working formally versus informally
capturing differences in per-period net incomes but also all consequences for pension payments,
etc. Then the implicit decision rule can be written as follows
ζ = vF · ln
(
MBF + ϕ
2
F
ϕ1F
)
.
The scale and shift parameters ϕ1F and ϕ
2
F are age- and skill-specific and are used to match
the observed formality rates as described in section A.1. The size of the effect of a change
in the marginal benefits of working formally on the formality rate is captured in the semi-
elasticity parameter vF . We chose the findings presented in Koettl and Weber (2012) as basis
34Another challenge may be the precision of shadow economy measures. For instance, two different empirical
studies considering the same period (1989-90) and using the same method (physical input) estimate the shadow
economy size in Poland at 17.7% of GDP and 27.2% respectively (table 5, Schneider and Enste, 2000).
35The information on Slovakia must be taken with care, as it is based on premium information for Poland. See
section A.2.
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for our elasticity choices. They find that a 1%-point increase in the formalization tax rate
(FTR) decreases the probability of working formally by 1.1% on average. Low-wage earners,
defined as persons earning about one third of the average wage, respond more (-2.5%-points).
The formalization tax rate is computed as informal net income minus formal net income as
percentage of informal net income,
FTR =
[(1 + τc)yinf + z]− y
(1 + τc)yinf + z
.
While y simply denotes formal net income, informal net income is defined as (1 + τc)yinf + z
for workers, i.e. the return from working informally (1 + τc)yinf plus claimed welfare benefits
z36. The static semi-elasticities vF were set such that the equilibrium response to a 1%-point
increase in the FTR leads to an average increase in informality by 1.1% for both countries as
found in Koettl and Weber (2012). The model calibration results in a higher responsiveness of
the low-wage earners than of average or high-wage earners. The reactions to a 1%-point rise in
the FTR are 1.6%, 1.1% and 0.7% increases in the informality rate for low-, medium- and high-
skilled. The response was also set to decrease in age (and therefore income) before slightly rising
again for the last working age group. The sensitivity of the low-skilled was set lower than the
reaction of the low-wage earners as defined in Koettl and Weber (2012) because they represent
two different groups. In this model low-skilled workers earn about 70% of the average wage
income which is about twice as much as for the group of low-wage earners analyzed in Koettl
and Weber (2012).
A.5 Demographics and aging
Capturing the demographic structure and its change over time is a key task of the model. In the
full model in period t an economy is inhabited by Nt persons who differ along two characteristics:
age (a ∈ {1, ..., 8}) and skill (i ∈ {low, medium, high}) resulting in 24 representative households
with mass Na,it each. The eight age groups are chosen as follows: 15-19, 20-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-
69, 70-79, 80-84, 85+. The first 4 age groups are comprised of potential workers. The age group
55-69 will partially participate in the labor market and partially retire given their retirement
decision. The last three age groups are in retirement. The overlapping generations structure
relies on the concept of ’Probabilistic Aging’ (see Grafenhofer et al. (2007)). Individuals age
stochastically which means that they switch from age group a ∈ {1, ..., 8} to age group a+1 with
a given probability 1−ωa per period. A period was chosen to be a year, hence the expected time
a person stays in age group a is be 1/(1 − ωa) years. In every period individuals face a death
probability of 1− γa, which is higher for members in old age groups. Over time the structure of
the population evolves according to the following law of motion
N1,it+1 = γ
1ω1N1,it +New
i
t+1,
Na,it+1 = γ
aωaNa,it + γ
a−1(1− ωa−1)Na−1,it , ∀a ∈ {2, ..., 8} ,
whereNewit+1 denotes the exogenous number of new entrants. Aggregation by age- and skill-class
then simply follows from summing up.
36Persons in the retirement stage age group 55-69 collect pensions instead of welfare benefits in case of informal
work.
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Nat =
∑
i
Na,it , N
i
t =
∑
a
Na,it , Nt =
∑
a
Nat =
∑
i
N it .
The demographic structure is determined by two sets of parameters: a) the age-dependent sur-
vival rates γa and b) the number of new entrants New. Holding both constant implies conver-
gence to a stationary demographic distribution. While the survival rates are solely responsible for
the determination of the stationary age-structure, the new entrants simply pin down population
size in the long run.
Hence, the task is to find appropriate values for γa and New in order to match the Slovak and
the Polish demographic structure. A typical restriction when using equilibrium models is that
a simulation has to start in an initial steady state although aging is an ongoing process. This
implies two kinds of mistakes. On one hand, γa can be set to match the observed survival
rates for the calibration year 2010. This implies realistic life-expectancies and therefore life-cycle
decision making. The downside is that computing a stationary demographic distribution based
on the currently observed γa will lead to a much older age-structure than actually observed in
2010. If on the other hand, γa are set to replicate the currently observed age-structure, this
will lead to life-cycle decisions based on much short life-expectations. We carefully compromise
between those two targets. The model fit of the demographic structure is illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4: Model fit of the demographic structure for Slovakia and Poland
(a) Slovakia (b) Poland
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Source: Data from United Nations, World Population Prospects (2010).
Note: “long run” in the data refers to the year 2100.
For the final steady state the model was calibrated in order to match the demographic structure
of the population forecasts of the United Nations for the year 2100. The age structure was
matched by adjusting the survival rates γa accordingly, i.e. reducing the mortality rates for
older individuals. In addition the number of new entrants37 flowing into the pool of 15+ year
old persons was reduced to replicate the predicted fall in population size (about -19% and -25%
for the 15+ population for Slovakia and Poland, respectively). In the aging scenario therefore
both γa and New are shocked while all other parameters were kept constant.
A.6 Changes in original calibration
The largest part of the procedure is inherited from the full scale model without informality.
As planned, we relied on this procedure to calibrate all parameters not related to informality
and were ready to adjust it, if needed. Although informality modifies some of the output of
37The new entrants are interpreted to capture both, newborns and net migration.
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the original procedure, it turns out that the modification has no meaningful consequences so
the original procedure remains untouched. Specifically, adding informality resulted in higher
calibrated wages in the formal sector. As households now allocate a fraction of their labor
supply to the informal sector, the effective labor supply in the formal sector decreases while
output remains the same, inflating their productivity and wages. This has no impact, as the
level of wages is never interpreted in the model but only the differences between households types
and after reforms.
A.7 Summary data requirements
Table 13 summarizes the sources of information for the calibration related to informality and
population aging.
Table 13: Informality parameters and calibration sources
Parameter Data requirement Data source
ϕa0 - Scaling net disutility of working formally 1 - Participation in black market, (1), Table 3
given participation
2 - Total labor market participation, (2)
on formal and informal markets
vF - Elasticity net disutility of working formally Response informality rate with (1), Table 4
tax changes
yainf - Income profiles informal sector Separate income profiles for (2)
5 age groups for informal workers
γa - Mortality rates by age-class Projected demographic structure (3)
and size
Sources:
(1): Koettl and Weber (2012)
(2): EU-SILC
(3): United Nations (2011)
A.8 Summary of elasticities for labor supply margins
Table 14 reports the chosen elasticities for the labor supply margins as they have been used in
Berger et al. (2009) and add those for informality.
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Table 14: Elasticities of labor supply
Elasticity Value (x)* Interpretation
intensive labor supply (hours) 0.1/0.09/0.08 x% increase in hours
for 1% increase in wage rate
participation 0.125/0.103/0.06 x%-points increase in participation rate
for 1% decrease in effective tax factor
retirement 0.104/0.087/0.048 x%-points increase in retirement rate
for 1% increase in effective tax factor
search intensity 0.111 x%-points change in unemployment rate
for 1%-point change in replacement rate
informality 1.6/1.1/0.7 x% change in informality rate
for 1%-point change in FTR
* Values are reported for low, medium and high skills. Motivation for labor supply elasticity
choices other than informality can be found in Berger et al. (2009).
B Reforms table
This appendix reproduces the reforms table document dated 26 September 2012, which defined
the reform scenarios to be analyzed in the project, updated after the discussion of the draft final
report. The updates include the choice of combined reforms made by the World Bank on 22
April 2013. It also highlights the links between the model components and assumptions and
what this implies for reform scenarios.
Reform Scenarios Model component and illustration
Retirement age (+) Workers choose when to retire depending, among
others, on (Gruber-Wise) financial incentives for work
after the statutory retirement age and penalties for
retirement before
E.g. an increase in retirement age reduce pension
expenditures and increase social security budget
revenue but could decrease labor supply attractiveness
Social security
contribution rates
(+), (-), (1) Households decide to participate in formal sector, in
informal sector or not at all depending on net incomes
E.g. a decrease in SSC rates could decrease
contribution per formal work unit but encourage work
in general and in the formal sector in particular, so
social security budget could be impacted either way
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Reform Scenarios Model component and illustration
Pension benefits (+), (-), (2) Households decide how much to save and self-finance
for retirement, as well as retirement date and whether
to join formal or informal sector, depending on social
security pension benefits
E.g. an increase in benefits (earnings-related or flat
parts) draws more on social security budget but
encourages work in general and work in the formal
sector in particular
Welfare benefits (+), (-) Households decide to participate in formal sector, in
informal sector or not at all depending on net
replacement incomes + informal sector participants
can claim welfare benefits as government can not
observe informal sector participation
E.g. higher welfare benefits increases attractiveness of
non-participation and informal sector
Labor income taxes (+), (-) In general: see social security contribution rates
Labor income taxes and SSC rates have different
progressivity profiles, so are investigated separately
Consumption taxes (+), (-) Informal sector participants charge after-tax price and
keep VAT
E.g. an increase in VAT could increase informality:
selling products on the black market can be more
attractive since informal sector participants keep the
VAT proceeds
Capital income
taxes
(+), (-), (5) No direct relationship to informality, as there are no
informal sector banks. Population aging and capital
income taxation could impact decisions, capital
accumulation and growth.
Productivity
growth
(+), (-), (3) Productivity in both formal and informal sector grows
at an exogenously given rate, impacting revenues in
the same fashion (wages grow at the same rate as
productivity in equilibrium)
E.g. different productivity growth may impact
decisions to self-finance for retirement, thus overall
savings, capital stock and output
Pension indexation (-) Rationale: reducing the future financial burden of past
promises on generous benefits
Labor income tax
& Pension benefits
(-) & (-) Rationale: stimulate work in the formal sector in a
budget neutral way (ex-ante: neglecting anticipated
positive household labor supply effect)
Labor income tax
& Pension benefits
& Retirement age
(-) & (-) &
(+)
Rationale: stimulate work in the formal sector in a
budget neutral way and contribute to deficit reduction
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Reform Scenarios Model component and illustration
Labor income tax
& Consumption
tax
(-) & (+) Rationale: belongs to policy reforms which could help
job and output growth
Retirement age &
pension benefits &
capital income tax
(+) & (-) &
(-)
Continued old age security policy reform mix made of
increasing retirement age, earnings-related pension
benefits cuts, encouraging private savings with capital
income tax decrease
Table legend: (+): increase, (-) decrease, (1): changes on workers and firm social security rates,
(2): changes on earning-related and flat parts of pensions, (3): exogenous variations, (4):
selection will be based on experiments results, focused on interesting unexpected outcomes; (5)
will be done for the final report.
Reminders:
• in all cases, population aging is taken into account (from demographic projections; consis-
tent with the projected age-pyramid structure)
• government consumption and health-care costs will stay constant in per-capita terms (not
age-dependent)
• simulations using non-distortionary taxes as budget closing instrument (keeping govern-
ment debt constant) in a first step to quantify the fiscal gap. In a second step, the gov-
ernment budget will be closed using distortionary taxes which will introduce additional
feedback effects on labor supply.
The effect of population aging and the policy reforms will be quantified and analyzed along
several dimensions:
• Macroeconomic outcomes: changes in GDP/capita, consumption/capita
• Labor market outcomes: changes in participation rate, informality rate, unemployment
rate, effective retirement age, hours supply on formal market, net wages on formal market
• Welfare and distributional outcomes: for each three skill and eight age classes, changes in
labor earnings, welfare benefits, pension payments, total income
• Public finance outcomes: pension expenditures increase, government budget deficit, total
social security budget deficit, total revenue variation, total expenditure variation
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C Additional results
Table 16: Overview of further long run simulation results for Slovakia
r0
r3
34
r2
4
r3
24
r3
27
r3
29
r1
06
r8
1
r8
6
r9
6
r7
1
20
10
A
gi
ng
SS
C
-
P
en
-
P
en
+
P
en
fl
at
+
P
en
E
ar
+
W
el
fa
re
+
In
cT
ax
+
In
cT
ax
-
V
A
T
-
g-
ab
so
lu
te
n
u
m
be
rs
P
op
ul
at
io
n
(1
5+
,
no
rm
al
iz
ed
)
10
0.
00
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
81
.0
0
D
ep
en
de
nc
y
ra
ti
o
19
.1
7
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
45
.6
9
P
en
si
on
er
s
(i
n
%
of
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
24
.8
7
40
.3
1
40
.1
7
40
.4
2
40
.2
1
40
.7
0
40
.1
8
40
.3
1
40
.5
0
40
.1
4
40
.2
0
40
.3
7
E
ff
ec
ti
ve
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ag
e
58
.0
2
58
.2
2
58
.3
3
58
.1
3
58
.3
0
57
.9
2
58
.3
2
58
.2
2
58
.0
8
58
.3
5
58
.3
0
58
.1
7
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
14
.7
4
14
.4
1
13
.7
9
15
.0
0
13
.8
8
14
.4
6
13
.8
5
14
.0
9
15
.2
2
13
.7
0
14
.0
1
14
.1
4
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
rl
y
ho
ur
s
p
er
fo
rm
al
w
or
ke
r)
17
86
17
85
17
95
17
76
17
94
17
86
17
94
17
85
17
73
17
96
17
93
17
86
E
ff
ec
ti
ve
fo
rm
al
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
r
ho
ur
s/
ca
pi
ta
)
79
3
66
7
72
6
62
1
71
4
65
4
71
8
62
9
60
2
73
4
71
0
70
8
L
ow
-s
ki
ll
s
p
op
ul
at
io
n
(i
n
%
of
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
9.
06
9.
68
9.
60
9.
76
9.
61
9.
51
9.
61
9.
94
9.
79
9.
58
9.
59
9.
70
M
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
ll
p
op
ul
at
io
n
(i
n
%
of
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
75
.1
8
77
.2
3
76
.8
5
77
.5
5
76
.9
4
77
.3
7
76
.9
1
77
.3
2
77
.7
8
76
.7
4
76
.8
7
76
.9
4
H
ig
h-
sk
il
l
p
op
ul
at
io
n
(i
n
%
of
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
15
.7
6
13
.0
9
13
.5
6
12
.6
9
13
.4
6
13
.1
2
13
.4
8
12
.7
4
12
.4
3
13
.6
9
13
.5
4
13
.3
7
In
fo
rm
al
it
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
)
12
.7
4
9.
32
3.
56
13
.8
2
4.
81
10
.4
3
4.
48
14
.0
3
15
.8
3
2.
83
5.
01
3.
73
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(l
ow
-s
ki
ll
ed
)
-
-3
.4
9
-4
.2
7
-2
.5
2
-4
.3
5
-3
.0
0
-4
.4
2
7.
60
-4
.1
1
-2
.9
4
-3
.8
4
4.
05
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
ll
ed
)
-
-3
.0
3
-3
.6
6
-2
.4
0
-3
.5
8
-2
.9
3
-3
.6
1
-3
.0
8
-3
.0
5
-3
.0
3
-3
.2
0
4.
05
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(h
ig
h-
sk
il
le
d)
-
13
.8
1
12
.4
6
15
.0
3
12
.7
9
13
.0
1
12
.7
9
13
.3
9
19
.0
3
9.
63
12
.4
4
21
.8
6
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
p
er
b
en
efi
ci
ar
y*
-
-1
.4
1
10
.8
8
-4
6.
56
49
.1
3
37
.0
4
50
.1
9
-6
.2
2
-1
0.
31
7.
90
4.
63
-0
.3
8
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a*
-
-1
4.
52
-7
.1
3
-2
0.
29
-8
.6
1
-1
5.
89
-8
.1
7
-1
8.
60
-2
2.
89
-5
.9
1
-8
.8
9
-7
.4
7
In
fo
rm
al
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a*
-
-4
2.
97
-7
6.
06
-1
7.
74
-6
8.
83
-3
7.
07
-7
0.
74
-1
8.
64
-6
.4
4
-8
0.
44
-6
7.
52
-6
4.
03
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
go
od
s)
*
-
5.
36
15
.4
8
-4
.3
2
15
.8
1
10
.2
1
16
.1
9
3.
92
-5
.3
0
17
.0
3
13
.8
6
-3
.2
5
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
&
in
fo
rm
al
go
od
s)
*
-
0.
02
5.
38
-5
.8
0
6.
47
4.
99
6.
60
1.
43
-5
.4
3
6.
28
4.
88
-7
.0
7
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
co
ns
um
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
*
-
-5
6.
12
-6
8.
79
-2
6.
24
-9
0.
51
-9
5.
80
-9
0.
51
-6
6.
53
-4
5.
39
-7
0.
64
-7
4.
63
2.
34
A
ss
et
s/
ca
pi
ta
*
-
33
.9
3
35
.3
8
40
.5
6
26
.3
5
28
.0
7
26
.2
1
36
.7
5
32
.3
1
35
.6
9
31
.6
6
-8
.9
7
in
%
of
ba
si
s
G
D
P
P
en
si
on
ex
p
en
di
tu
re
7.
10
9.
19
10
.3
0
4.
99
13
.8
6
12
.9
0
13
.9
5
8.
74
8.
40
10
.0
1
9.
72
11
.3
7
P
en
si
on
ex
p
en
di
tu
re
(c
on
st
an
t
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
7.
10
11
.3
4
12
.7
1
6.
17
17
.1
1
15
.9
2
17
.2
2
10
.7
9
10
.3
7
12
.3
6
12
.0
1
14
.0
3
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fi
ci
t
0.
08
5.
08
7.
36
1.
43
9.
19
8.
95
9.
24
5.
05
5.
07
5.
09
4.
99
6.
07
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fi
ci
t
(c
on
st
an
t
p
op
ul
at
io
n)
0.
08
6.
27
9.
09
1.
76
11
.3
5
11
.0
5
11
.4
1
6.
24
6.
26
6.
29
6.
17
7.
49
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fi
ci
t
0.
04
4.
40
6.
12
0.
50
8.
77
8.
20
8.
83
4.
20
4.
04
4.
78
4.
64
5.
91
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fi
ci
t
(c
on
st
p
op
)
0.
04
5.
43
7.
56
0.
62
10
.8
2
10
.1
2
10
.9
0
5.
19
4.
99
5.
90
5.
73
7.
30
N
ot
es
:
A
ll
re
fo
rm
s
ar
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
on
to
p
of
th
e
pu
re
ag
in
g
sc
en
ar
io
(r
0)
;
(*
):
nu
m
b
er
s
fo
r
g-
(r
71
)
sc
en
ar
io
s
co
m
pa
re
ab
so
lu
te
ch
an
ge
s
w
it
h
pu
re
ag
in
g
sc
en
ar
io
ca
se
(r
0)
54
Table 17: Overview of further long run simulation results for Poland
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Table 18: Overview of long run simulation results for Slovakia, VAT budget closure (1/2)
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Table 19: Overview of long run simulation results for Slovakia, VAT budget closure (2/2)
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Table 20: Results of the aging scenario over time for Slovakia with constant informality rates
2010 2020 2050 2070 Final SS
absolute numbers
Population (15+, normalized) 100.00 101.19 95.55 91.27 81.00
Dependency ratio 19.17 26.23 46.67 52.38 45.69
Pensioners (in % of population) 24.87 29.84 41.66 43.81 40.28
Effective retirement age 58.02 58.21 58.29 58.26 58.24
Unemployment rate 14.74 14.22 13.96 14.26 14.60
Employment (yearly hours per formal worker) 1786 1785 1787 1786 1785
Effective formal employment (year hours/capita) 793 777 645 611 640
Low-skills population (in % of population) 9.06 9.13 9.34 9.47 9.69
Medium-skill population (in % of population) 75.18 75.64 76.28 76.42 76.29
High-skill population (in % of population) 15.76 15.23 14.38 14.11 14.03
Informality rate (in % of participants) 12.74 12.82 12.81 12.74 12.68
increase from basis in %
Labor costs (low-skilled) - -2.78 -1.59 -2.95 -4.82
Labor costs (medium-skilled) - -1.85 -0.75 -1.87 -3.75
Labor costs (high-skilled) - -2.36 18.61 19.97 16.68
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.58 -0.74 1.97 -5.82
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -3.38 -16.10 -20.19 -18.08
Informal GDP/capita - -1.54 -17.90 -22.77 -20.19
Consumption/capita (formal goods) - -11.05 1.15 4.47 2.76
Consumption/capita (formal & informal goods) - -10.00 -0.95 1.46 0.23
Government consumption/capita - -24.59 -64.71 -79.70 -69.48
Assets/capita - 4.09 24.28 30.48 35.24
in % of basis GDP
Pension expenditure 7.10 8.48 11.28 11.64 8.77
Pension expenditure (constant population) 7.10 8.38 11.80 12.75 10.83
Social security deficit 0.08 1.83 6.47 7.60 5.01
Social security deficit (constant population) 0.08 1.81 6.77 8.33 6.19
Pension social security deficit 0.04 1.61 5.66 6.59 4.18
Pension social security deficit (const pop) 0.04 1.59 5.92 7.22 5.16
Note: Final SS refers to the final steady state which approximately corresponds to the year 2100.
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Table 21: Results of the SSC+ scenario over time for Slovakia
2010 2020 2050 2070 Final SS
absolute numbers
Population (15+, normalized) 100.00 101.19 95.55 91.27 81.00
Dependency ratio 19.17 26.23 46.67 52.38 45.69
Pensioners (in % of population) 24.87 29.97 41.82 43.98 40.45
Effective retirement age 58.02 58.12 58.18 58.15 58.12
Unemployment rate 14.74 14.63 14.37 14.65 15.04
Employment (yearly hours per formal worker) 1786 1777 1777 1777 1776
Effective formal employment (year hours/capita) 793 752 637 599 614
Low-skills population (in % of population) 9.06 9.13 9.37 9.52 9.76
Medium-skill population (in % of population) 75.18 75.80 77.04 77.47 77.61
High-skill population (in % of population) 15.76 15.07 13.59 13.01 12.63
Informality rate (in % of participants) 12.74 14.29 12.32 12.88 14.60
increase from basis in %
Labor costs (low-skilled) - 1.63 0.58 -0.65 -2.69
Labor costs (medium-skilled) - 2.57 0.69 -0.34 -2.38
Labor costs (high-skilled) - 2.22 15.83 18.52 15.29
Pension payment per beneficiary - -2.52 -3.54 -1.37 -11.77
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -6.11 -17.00 -21.51 -21.11
Informal GDP/capita - 8.38 -24.38 -26.23 -13.36
Consumption/capita (formal goods) - -16.31 -3.08 -0.20 -3.21
Consumption/capita (formal & informal goods) - -13.59 -5.43 -3.07 -4.33
Government consumption/capita - -4.33 -41.47 -57.25 -47.12
Assets/capita - 1.59 21.49 27.46 32.71
in % of basis GDP
Pension expenditure 7.10 8.44 11.00 11.30 8.25
Pension expenditure (constant population) 7.10 8.34 11.51 12.38 10.19
Social security deficit 0.08 -0.28 4.43 5.72 3.29
Social security deficit (constant population) 0.08 -0.28 4.64 6.27 4.06
Pension social security deficit 0.04 0.45 4.43 5.42 3.02
Pension social security deficit (const pop) 0.04 0.45 4.63 5.94 3.72
Note: SSC+ scenario includes aging and an increase of social security contributions by 3% of 2010 GDP.
Final SS refers to the final steady state which approximately corresponds to the year 2100.
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D Details on sensitivity analyses
Table 22: Overview of selected aging simulation results for different calibrations for Slovakia
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Table 23: Overview of selected SSC+ simulation results for different calibrations for Slovakia
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Table 24: Overview of selected aging simulation results for different calibrations for Poland
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Table 25: Overview of selected SSC+ simulation results for different calibrations for Poland
s0
s1
s3
s5
s7
s9
s1
4
ba
si
s
el
as
t
in
f+
el
as
t
ho
ur
+
el
as
t
pa
rt
+
yi
nf
+
yi
nf
st
ee
p
eq
ua
l
in
f
ra
te
20
10
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
SS
C
+
ab
so
lu
te
nu
m
be
rs
P
op
ul
at
io
n
(1
5+
,
no
rm
al
iz
ed
)
10
0.
00
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
75
.0
0
D
ep
en
de
nc
y
ra
ti
o
22
.6
6
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
46
.1
5
P
en
si
on
er
s
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
26
.0
2
39
.0
8
39
.0
9
39
.0
8
39
.0
6
39
.0
8
39
.0
8
39
.0
6
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ag
e
59
.3
7
59
.3
0
59
.2
9
59
.3
0
59
.3
1
59
.3
0
59
.3
0
59
.3
1
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
ra
te
13
.3
6
13
.7
8
13
.7
1
13
.7
9
13
.7
8
13
.7
8
13
.7
9
14
.2
5
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
rl
y
ho
ur
s
pe
r
fo
rm
al
w
or
ke
r)
19
39
19
25
19
24
19
24
19
25
19
25
19
25
19
25
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
fo
rm
al
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(y
ea
r
ho
ur
s/
ca
pi
ta
)
60
4
46
4
45
5
46
4
46
4
46
4
46
4
46
4
L
ow
-s
ki
lls
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
12
.0
3
12
.2
8
12
.2
6
12
.2
8
12
.2
8
12
.2
7
12
.2
9
12
.2
9
M
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
ll
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
66
.8
2
70
.0
3
70
.4
6
70
.0
7
70
.0
3
70
.0
1
70
.0
6
70
.0
6
H
ig
h-
sk
ill
po
pu
la
ti
on
(i
n
%
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
21
.1
5
17
.6
9
17
.2
9
17
.6
5
17
.6
9
17
.7
2
17
.6
4
17
.6
4
In
fo
rm
al
it
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
)
33
.1
8
37
.2
8
38
.6
4
37
.3
0
37
.2
7
37
.2
6
37
.3
0
36
.9
2
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(l
ow
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-0
.2
5
0.
09
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
1
-0
.3
3
-0
.6
0
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(m
ed
iu
m
-s
ki
lle
d)
-
-1
.9
8
-1
.3
2
-1
.9
8
-1
.9
6
-1
.9
3
-2
.0
6
-1
.8
0
L
ab
or
co
st
s
(h
ig
h-
sk
ill
ed
)
-
9.
60
8.
82
9.
61
9.
58
9.
49
9.
66
9.
80
P
en
si
on
pa
ym
en
t
pe
r
be
ne
fic
ia
ry
-
-1
1.
86
-1
2.
95
-1
1.
93
-1
1.
82
-1
1.
83
-1
1.
91
-1
1.
23
in
cr
ea
se
fr
om
ba
si
s
in
%
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-2
1.
32
-2
2.
61
-2
1.
40
-2
1.
29
-2
1.
28
-2
1.
40
-2
0.
89
In
fo
rm
al
G
D
P
/c
ap
it
a
-
-1
0.
57
-8
.2
9
-1
0.
55
-1
0.
56
-1
0.
60
-1
2.
12
-1
1.
88
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
go
od
s)
-
-9
.4
8
-1
0.
51
-9
.6
1
-9
.4
6
-9
.4
5
-9
.6
1
-9
.1
4
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
(f
or
m
al
&
in
fo
rm
al
go
od
s)
-
-9
.8
1
-9
.8
3
-9
.9
0
-9
.8
0
-9
.8
1
-1
0.
38
-9
.9
8
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
co
ns
um
pt
io
n/
ca
pi
ta
-
-5
9.
36
-6
1.
08
-5
9.
58
-5
9.
32
-5
9.
32
-5
9.
58
-5
9.
27
A
ss
et
s/
ca
pi
ta
-
9.
82
10
.2
1
9.
42
9.
81
9.
81
9.
34
9.
31
in
%
of
ba
si
s
G
D
P
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
13
.1
6
13
.0
6
12
.9
1
13
.0
5
13
.0
6
13
.0
7
13
.0
5
13
.1
5
P
en
si
on
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
13
.1
6
17
.4
2
17
.2
1
17
.4
0
17
.4
2
17
.4
2
17
.4
1
17
.5
4
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
8.
04
9.
29
9.
25
9.
29
9.
29
9.
29
9.
28
9.
34
So
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
an
t
po
pu
la
ti
on
)
8.
04
12
.3
8
12
.3
4
12
.3
8
12
.3
8
12
.3
8
12
.3
8
12
.4
6
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
5.
90
7.
70
7.
64
7.
69
7.
70
7.
70
7.
69
7.
76
P
en
si
on
so
ci
al
se
cu
ri
ty
de
fic
it
(c
on
st
po
p)
5.
90
10
.2
6
10
.1
8
10
.2
6
10
.2
6
10
.2
7
10
.2
6
10
.3
5
N
ot
es
:
A
ll
SS
C
+
(r
34
)
re
fo
rm
s
ar
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
on
to
p
of
th
e
pu
re
ag
in
g
sc
en
ar
io
(r
0)
.
63
References
Albrecht, J., L. Navarro, and S. Vroman (2009): “The Effects of Labour Market Policies
in an Economy with an Informal Sector,” Economic Journal, 119, 1105–1129.
Amaral, P. S. and E. Quintin (2006): “A competitive model of the informal sector,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 53, 1541–1553.
Berger, J., C. Keuschnigg, M. Keuschnigg, M. Miess, L. Strohner, and R. Winter-
Ebmer (2009): “Modelling of Labour Markets in the European Union,” Final Report for DG
EMPL of the European Commission.
Bird, R. M. and M. Smart (2012): “Financing Social Expenditures in Developing Countries:
Payroll or Value Added Taxes?” International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series
paper 1206, Georgia State University.
Boeri, T. and K. Terrell (2002): “Institutional Determinants of Labor Reallocation in
Transition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 51–76.
Chawla, M., G. Betcherman, and A. Banerji (2007): From red to gray: the" third transi-
tion" of aging populations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, The World Bank.
Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (2012): The 2012 Ageing
Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 27 EU Member States (2010-2060), vol. 2,
European Economy.
Fortin, B., N. Marceau, and L. Savard (1997): “Taxation, wage controls and the informal
sector,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 293–312.
Fugazza, M. and J.-F. Jacques (2004): “Labor market institutions, taxation and the under-
ground economy,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 395–418.
Galiani, S. and F. Weinschelbaum (2012): “Modeling Informality Formally: Households
and Firms,” Economic Inquiry, 50, 821–838.
Grafenhofer, D., C. Jaag, C. Keuschnigg, and M. Keuschnigg (2007): “Economic
ageing and demographic change,” Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 133–165.
Hayashi, F. (1982): “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation,” Econo-
metrica, 50, 213–24.
Ihrig, J. and K. S. Moe (2004): “Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and government
policy,” Journal of Development Economics, 73, 541–557.
Jimeno, J. F., J. A. Rojas, and S. Puente (2008): “Modelling the impact of aging on social
security expenditures,” Economic Modelling, 25, 201–224.
Koettl, J. and M. Weber (2012): “Does Formal Work Pay? The Role of Labor Taxation and
Social Benefit Design in the New EU Member States,” in Informal Employment in Emerging
and Transition Economies, ed. by S. Polachek and K. Tatsiramos, Emerald Group, vol. 34 of
Research in Labor Economics, 167–204.
OECD (2003): Reforming Pulic Pensions, Sharing the experiences of Transtion and OECD
countries, OECD Publishing.
64
Schneider, F. (2012): “The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not)
Know?” IZA Discussion Papers 6423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Schneider, F., A. Buehn, and C. E. Montenegro (2010): “Shadow economies all over the
world : new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007,” Policy Research Working Paper
Series 5356, The World Bank.
Schneider, F. and C. Burger (2005): “Formal and Informal Labour Markets: Challenges
and Policy in the Central and Eastern European New EU Members and Candidate Countries,”
CESifo Economic Studies, 51, 77–115.
Schneider, F. and D. H. Enste (2000): “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Conse-
quences,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 77–114.
Svejnar, J. (2002): “Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 16, 3–28.
United Nations (2011): World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
65
  
 
 
Authors: Christian Keuschnigg, Thomas Davoine, Philip Schuster 
 
Title: Aging, informality and public finances in Poland and Slovakia - A general equilibrium approach, 
background paper for the ECA Old-Age Insurance World Bank report  
 
Projektbericht/Research Report 
 
© 2013 Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna •  +43 1 59991-0 • Fax +43 1 59991-555 • http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
